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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of a bring-your-own-device (BYOD) program is to increase productivity as 
it allows individuals to access and manipulate data from non-traditional workplaces to 
support mission requirements. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has started a 
pilot BYOD program, but a user policy for the USMC BYOD program has not yet been 
identified, despite the driving force that policy has on final implementation and potential 
acceptance. Therefore, this thesis answers the question, is it possible to develop a BYOD 
user policy for the USMC that minimizes risk for all parties while allowing for the 
intended flexibility? 
Three case studies were conducted on organizations that have implemented 
BYOD programs, comparing user policies and best practices to mitigate risks and address 
user privacy concerns. The case studies were also compared with governing Department 
of Defense instructions and National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance to 
identify a baseline of applicable security controls to formulate a viable user policy and 
agreement to support USMC security requirements. 
This thesis found that a clearly articulated user agreement tailored to the USMC’s 
technological solution can be written to support the successful implementation of its 
BYOD program to ensure the benefits outweigh the potential risks. 
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One consequence of cheap, small, and powerful mobile devices constantly 
connected to the Internet is that many individuals consider their mobile devices as 
necessary personal appliances, much like a wristwatch in prior decades. Such people refer 
to their personal devices regularly throughout the day to check email, text messages, 
social media updates, sporting event scores, etc. This behavior has led to a movement 
called bring-your-own-device (BYOD), because these users would prefer to use their 
personal devices as their work device that creates what is known as a “dual use” 
capability. This movement has advantages and risks for the employee, as well as the 
employer. 
The BYOD trend has taken root in numerous areas of both the commercial sector, 
as well as organizations within the federal government. BYOD provides organizations an 
alternative method for connecting the workforce and can offer the unique capability of 
using a mobile device based on personal preferences for both private and corporate 
activities. The flexibility that BYOD provides can redefine the concept of a workspace, 
while also reducing the overhead associated with information technology (IT) and 
wireless expenditures. This reduction in organizational overhead is realized through the 
sharing of costs between the employee and the enterprise. Users will pay the costs for 
voice and data plans while the enterprise funds the management of the devices and the 
capabilities for accessing work data on their personally-owned devices.1 Despite these 
advantages with BYOD, both sides need to understand the challenges and risks prior to 
implementation. Vital components of any BYOD program are the development and 
implementation of policy to ensure that both the device and data are secure, while also 
promoting user personal privacy. The Department of Defense (DOD) has recognized the 
compelling benefits of BYOD, and consequently, identified it as a long-term objective 
                                                 




within the DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan.2 However, the lack of 
existing DOD policies is one of several obstacles preventing the adoption of BYOD.3 For 
its part, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed a BYOD pilot program 
in line with the Marine Corps Commercial Mobile Device Strategy and the DOD 
Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan.4, 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since 2012, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computers Department (C4), Cybersecurity Division has been 
engaged in the planning and development of a BYOD pilot program focused on mobile 
devices being incorporated into unclassified networks. Implementation of a BYOD 
program aims to foster enhanced productivity, as it allows members to access and 
manipulate data from non-traditional work places to support mission requirements.5 
Moreover, BYOD has the potential to create substantial savings when compared to 
current USMC mobile phone expenses, and establishes avenues for saving in other 
areas.6 The ability to leverage hardware, for which the employee has already paid, 
establishes a cost-sharing model and eliminates some of the redundancy associated with 
providing government furnished devices and data plans to employees who prefer to use a 
personally-owned mobile device. 
The U.S. Navy and USMC currently spend a significant amount annually on the 
maintenance, procurement, and data plans associated with unclassified government 
                                                 
2 Department of Defense, DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan, Department of 
Defense Memorandum (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 16, http://www.defense.gov/ 
news/dodcMdimplementationplan.pdf. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Department (C4), Marine Corps Commercial 
Mobile Device Strategy (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2013), 3, http://www.hqmc. 
marines.mil/Portals/156/Newsfeeds/SV%20Documents/20130411_Marine_Corps_Commercial_mobile_de
vice_strategy_Final.pdf; Department of Defense, DOD Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan, 
16. 
5 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Department (C4), Marine Corps Commercial 
Mobile Device Strategy, 3. 
6 Rita Boland, “Pocket to Payload, Personal Technologies Serve the Marine Corps Environment,” 
Signal Online, April 1, 2014, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/12513. 
 3 
furnished mobile devices. In fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of the Navy (DON) 
spent $60.2 million on government furnished mobile devices and associated data plans 
with the USMC portion being $14.8 million.7 For the first 10 months of FY14, the total 
DON expenditures are similar at $45.2 million spent on mobile devices with the USMC’s 
costs at $11.1 million.8 BYOD can be leveraged within the DON to capitalize on the fact 
that most individuals already own portable and mobile devices of their preference that 
can also be used for work related activities. 
According to a study conducted by Pew Research, 58 percent of Americans own a 
smartphone as of January 2014.9 Within this overall percentage, 83 percent of the 
American population within the 18–29 age range owns a smartphone and 74 percent of 
30–49 year olds own a smartphone.10 Another study conducted by Edison Research 
found similar results.11 A related study conducted by the Pew Research Center identified 
that 85 percent of smartphone owners within the 18–29 age range are the most likely to 
utilize their smartphones to go online, while the 30–49 age range is not far behind at 73 
percent.12 Over 50 percent of these individuals also utilize email services via their 
smartphones.13 These statistics translate to an enormous age demographic within the 
USMC and Navy ranks, as shown in Table 1, who utilize and understand the flexibility 
that mobile devices provide. According to 2013 demographics, 82.9 percent of active 
                                                 
7 Leontine P. Thompson (Strategic Sourcing Manager, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
Fleet Logistics Center (FLC), San Diego, CA) e-mail message to the author, September 23, 2014.  
8 Ibid. 
9 “Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership Demographics,” accessed December 22, 2014, http://www. 
pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/cell-phone-and-smartphone-ownership-demographics/.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Tom Webster, “2014 Smartphone Ownership Demographics,” Edison Research, April 25, 2014, 
http://www.edisonresearch.com/2014-smartphone-ownership-demographics/. 
12 Maeve Duggan and Aaron Smith, “Cell Internet Use 2013,” Pew Research Internet Project, 
September 16, 2013, http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/16/main-findings-2/. 
13 Ibid. 
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duty Marines are between the ages of 18 to 30 years old.14 Active duty U.S. Navy service 
members within the same age range comprise 64.6 percent of the total force.15 
Table 1.   U.S. Military Age Demographics16 
Age Distribution of Active Duty Force 
Service 18–21 22–30 31–40 41–50 51–59 Average 
 Marines 36.9% 46% 14.0% 3.1% 0.2% 25 
Navy 18.6% 46% 26.3% 8.3% 0.8% 29 
Army 18.3% 48% 25.6% 7.9% 0.7% 29 
Air Force 14.4% 46% 28.3% 10.0% 0.6% 30 
Coast Guard 12.2% 48% 27.0% 12.0% 1.0% 30 
 
Many companies have adapted policies and practices to incorporate personally-
owned smartphones, tablets and even laptops into their network infrastructure.17 This 
practice creates a dual-use device for employees that can be used for both personal and 
business purposes. The private and public sector entities that have adopted BYOD 
solutions report that allowing employees to use their personal mobile devices to access 
company resources often results in increased employee productivity and job 
satisfaction.18 Although the USMC has made significant progress regarding 
technological solutions, significant questions remain regarding BYOD user policy and 
privacy considerations. 
                                                 
14 Defense Manpower Research, “Demographics of Active Duty U.S. Military,” Statistic Brain, 
November 23, 2013, http://www.statisticbrain.com/demographics-of-active-duty-u-s-military/. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Teena Hammond, “Unavoidable: 62 Percent of Companies to Allow BYOD by Year’s End,” 
ZDNet, February 4, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/article/unavoidable-62-percent-of-companies-to-allow-
byod-by-years-end/. 
18 “Bring Your Own Device: A Toolkit to Support Federal Agencies Implementing Bring Your Own 
Device (BYOD) Programs,” footnote 2, August 23, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/digitalgov/bring-
your-own-device. 
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B. BYOD RISKS 
The adoption of a BYOD program does not come without risks for the employer. 
These risks fall into two main categories. The first relates to the control of organizational 
data, namely personally identifiable information (PII) and other sensitive but unclassified 
data.19 The second pertains to user behavior while utilizing a personally-owned device to 
access organizational resources.20 
A BYOD program also introduces concerns for the employee. These concerns 
stem from the employee expectation of privacy while using a personally-owned device. 
Employees must be assured that personal activities conducted and personal data resident 
on their device will remain confidential and not accessible or subject to organizational 
monitoring. Conversely, the organization must have the ability to monitor employee 
activity and control organizational information while the device is utilized for conducting 
work for the organization. For example, some employees may think that acceptable use 
policies should not be as stringent since they are using their personally-owned device. 
This issue opens the door for a possible decrease in worker productivity while also 
increasing security concerns. Security risks associated with acceptable user behavior—
while ensuring user privacy—are key factors for considering whether BYOD can be a 
worthwhile and successful endeavor for both the employee and the organization. 
Prior to signing up for participation in a BYOD program, employees will want 
assurance that they maintain the freedom to use their personally-owned devices as they 
please and are not subsequently constrained by the policies set forth by the employer. 
Additional issues pertinent to the USMC that should be considered are: liability if the 
device is used by an employee to commit a crime, using a device to conduct work during 
government furloughs, the transfer or separation of employees, and lost or stolen devices 
to name a few. These concerns from both sides can be addressed through policy, but 
despite the driving force that policy has on final implementation and potential 
                                                 
19 Garry G. Mathiason et al., The “Bring Your Own Device” to Work Movement: Engineering 
Practical Employment and Labor Law Compliance Solutions, The Littler Report (New York, NY: Littler 
Mendelson, P.C., 2012), 8. 
20 Ibid. 
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acceptance, a BYOD user policy for the USMC BYOD program has not yet been 
identified. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Because a BYOD user policy and associated user agreement is crucial to a secure 
and user friendly BYOD program within USMC networks, this thesis answers the 
question, is it possible to develop a BYOD user agreement for the USMC that minimizes 
risk for all parties while also allowing for the intended flexibility? To answer this primary 
question, it became apparent that the following secondary questions had to be answered. 
• What technological solutions and controls are employed by existing 
BYOD programs, and how do they affect the user policy and agreement? 
• What user policy and agreement practices can be leveraged from existing 
BYOD programs to mitigate USMC security concerns, such as the control 
and protection of organizational data, secure remote authentication, and 
compromised personally-owned mobile devices? 
• Aside from the security controls required to formulate a viable user 
agreement, should additional considerations be addressed prior to 
implementing a BYOD program within the USMC? 
• How is “user privacy” defined as it relates to personally-owned mobile 
devices utilized within a BYOD program? 
• What organizational policies are necessary to address and support user 
privacy on personally-owned devices operating within USMC networks? 
User agreements as determined by acceptable use policies and user privacy 
considerations associated with a BYOD program were the focus of this research effort. 
User agreements are commonly referred to as rules of behavior (RoB); however, for the 
purpose of this research, “user agreement” will be the norm. 
From the perspective of the USMC, the primary challenges associated with a 
BYOD program are the following. 
• Ensuring the integrity of the mobile operating system (OS). 
• Secure remote authentication from the mobile device to organizational 
servers. 
 7 
• The protection and control of organizational networks, as well as the data 
stored on a personally-owned device.21 
To effectively meet these challenges, the device owner must take an active and defined 
roll, which must be clearly spelled out in a user agreement. 
On the other hand, because employee satisfaction is necessary to make BYOD 
attractive to the end users, the issue of privacy must also be addressed, such that the 
limitations on the USMC are also clearly spelled out in a user agreement, so that the users 
have an accurate understanding of their expectation of privacy. 
D. MOBILE DEVICE DEFINITION 
Governing documents provide various mobile device characteristics. To provide a 
clear definition, it is, therefore, important to identify how a mobile device is characterized 
within these sources and then how a mobile device was defined for the purpose of this 
research. 
As noted in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication 800-124 Revision 1 (SP-800-124), mobile device features are constantly 
changing.22 As such, it is challenging to define the term “mobile device.” Furthermore, as 
mobile device features change, so do threats and the necessary security controls to 
mitigate them.23 The following hardware and software characteristics collectively define 
the mobile device baseline as delineated in the SP-800-124. 
• A small form factor 
• At least one wireless network interface for network access and data 
communications. This interface uses Wi-Fi, cellular networking, or other 
technologies that connect the mobile device to network infrastructures 
with connectivity to the Internet or other data networks. 
• Local built-in (non-removable) data storage 
                                                 
21 Robert Anderson (Chief of the Vision and Strategy Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 
Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4), Washington, DC), in discussion with the 
author, September 23, 2014. 
22 Murugiah Souppaya, Karen Scarfone, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 
Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise, NIST Special Publication (SP) 
800-124 Revision 1 (Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2013), 2–3, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-124r1.pdf. 
23 Ibid. 
 8 
• An OS that is not a full-fledged desktop or laptop OS 
• Applications available through multiple methods (i.e., provided with the 
mobile device, accessed through web browser, or acquired and installed 
from third parties)24 
NIST SP-800-124 highlights additional mobile device features that should be 
considered with regard to security risks, such as the following. 
• Digital cameras and the ability to capture video 
• Microphone and speakers 
• Network services: 
o Wireless personal area network interfaces, such as Bluetooth 
o Wireless network interfaces for voice communications, such as 
cellular 
o Global Positioning System (GPS), which enables location services 
• Storage: Support for removable media and support for using the device 
itself as removable storage for another computing device 
• Built-in features for synchronizing local data with a different location (i.e., 
desktop or laptop computer, organization servers, telecommunications 
provider servers, other third party servers, etc.)25 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a smartphone as: 
A smartphone has more capabilities than a cellphone. Consumers can use 
smartphones to run a wide variety of general and special-purpose software 
applications. Smartphones typically have a larger graphical display with 
greater resolution than cellphones and have either a keyboard or touch-
sensitive screen for alphanumeric input. Smartphones also offer expansion 
capabilities and other built-in wireless communications (such as WiFi and 
Bluetooth services).26 
The GAO describes a tablet personal computer as a “portable personal computer 
with a touch-sensitive screen. The tablet form is typically smaller than a notebook 
computer but larger than a smartphone.”27 
                                                 
24 Souppaya, Scarfone, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), Guidelines for 
Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise, 2–3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Security: Better Implementation of Controls 
for Mobile Devices Should Be Encouraged: Report to Congressional Committees (GAO-12-757) 




As this research primarily supports USMC BYOD efforts, the following mobile 
device definition was used, as stated in the DOD Mobile Device Strategy and the U.S. 
Marine Corps Mobility Strategy.  
A mobile device is a handheld computing device with a display screen that 
allows for user input (e.g., touch screen, keyboard). When connected to a 
network, it enables the sharing of information in formats specially 
designed to maximize the use of information given device limitations (i.e., 
screen size, computing power). Mobile devices provide the conveniences 
of conventional desktops or laptop computers in a more portable package. 
Examples of popular mobile devices include smart phones and tablets.28  
Laptop computers are not included in this definition. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF WORK 
To identify a baseline user agreement solution specific to the USMC’s BYOD 
program, as well as practices employed to safeguard user privacy, three organizations that 
had implemented a BYOD program were studied: two BYOD implementations from non-
DOD U.S. government organizations, and one commercial sector BYOD implementation. 
These three implementations, comprised of both private and public sector organizations, 
were compared and contrasted to obtain a starting point to develop a user agreement for 
the USMC. The security controls identified within these case studies were also compared 
with governing DOD instructions and NIST guidance to further refine a baseline of 
applicable security controls necessary to formulate a viable user agreement. The proposed 
user agreement was developed to address the USMC’s primary security requirements and 
was tailored to the USMC’s technological solutions. 
The researchers are not qualified to interpret law or provide legal opinions; 
therefore, complex legal issues associated with the implementation of a BYOD program 
were not the focus of this research. However, certain legal aspects related to employee 
privacy, user agreements and restrictions, and control of organizational data are 
discussed. The final product is a proposed BYOD user agreement that clearly identifies 
                                                 
28 Department of Defense, DOD Mobile Device Strategy, Department of Defense Memorandum, 
(Washington, DC: DOD, 2012), i, http://www.defense.gov/news/dodmobilitystrategy.pdf; Command, 
Control, Communications, and Computers Department (C4), Marine Corps Commercial Mobile Device 
Strategy, 4. 
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participant responsibilities and addresses potential privacy concerns. Programs to 
incentivize BYOD participation and a cost-benefit analysis were not the focus of this 
research and are not addressed in depth. In line with the DOD definition of a mobile 
device, laptop computers were not included within the scope of this research. 
Furthermore, this thesis did not attempt to answer the question of whether the DOD 
should continue its pursuit of BYOD, but instead, was focused on the user policy and 
agreement, as if BYOD is inevitable. 
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
It is expected that Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, C4, Cybersecurity Division 
will utilize the results of this research to advance its ongoing BYOD pilot program. 
Additionally, it is expected that the National Security Agency (NSA) will leverage the 
research findings as factors to consider for future implementations in the DOD. 
As stated in the USMC Mobility Strategy, “implementation of a BYOD program 
will allow for greater flexibility in the access, manipulation and dissemination of data 
from non-traditional work places to meet mission requirements.”29 This research 
provides the USMC with a viable user agreement to support identified technological 
solutions currently under evaluation, while at the same time, protecting user privacy. 
Furthermore, findings contained within this research will benefit broader DOD initiatives 
to expand mobile device solutions to include the ability to enhance the collection and 
dissemination of information on the battlefield. User policy and privacy concerns 
addressed by this research will help to ensure that the benefits of implementing a BYOD 
program within USMC networks will outweigh the potential risks. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter defines “mobile device” and introduces the concept and the potential 
benefits of a BYOD program while also providing context for this research, which seeks 
                                                 
29 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Department (C4), Marine Corps Commercial 
Mobile Device Strategy, 3. 
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to develop a viable user agreement to minimize risk to the Marine Corps enterprise 
network (MCEN) while protecting the privacy of BYOD participants. 
2. Chapter II: USMC BYOD Technological Approach and Case Study 
Comparisons 
This chapter describes the USMC’S pilot program and the BYOD technologies 
being evaluated. It also compares three BYOD program implementation case studies, 
which were utilized to identify best practices and a baseline of security controls 
applicable to the USMC BYOD program. Developing a baseline of controls was not the 
primary focus of the research, but it was necessary to understand how the various security 
controls could affect the content of the user agreement. 
3. Chapter III: BYOD Case Study Privacy Concerns 
This chapter defines “privacy” in the context of a BYOD program and describes 
the best practices and lessons learned from the same three case studies described in 
Chapter II to mitigate and address privacy concerns within a BYOD program. 
4. Chapter IV: BYOD Policy Development Methodology, Considerations 
and Recommendations 
This chapter discusses the methodology used to determine the applicable security 
controls for the formulation of the proposed user agreement. Recommendations and 
additional considerations regarding the implementation of a flexible and secure BYOD 
program within the USMC are also provided. 
5. Chapter V: Conclusions, Limitations and Future Work 
This chapter provides conclusions that address the research questions, the 
limitations encountered, and recommended future work. 
6. Appendix A: Comparative Analysis of Case Study Organization 
Security Controls 
This appendix provides a comparison of security controls listed within the case 
study BYOD user policies and the NIST Special Publication 800-53 (SP-800-53) to 




7. Appendix B: Proposed Bring-Your-Own-Device User Agreement 
This appendix represents the culmination of research efforts to propose a viable 
user agreement to support USMC BYOD implementation efforts. 
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II. USMC BYOD TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH AND CASE 
STUDY COMPARISONS  
A BYOD program has not yet been implemented within the DOD. However, the 
USMC is laying the foundation for the expansion of the BYOD trend to DOD networks 
by running a pilot project, but various risks must be mitigated prior to BYOD becoming a 
reality within the DOD.30 The primary security requirements identified by the USMC to 
address these risks are secure remote authentication, integrity of the mobile device OS, 
and control and protection of organizational networks and data.31 NIST defines security 
requirements as follows: 
Security requirements are those requirements levied on an information 
system that are derived from laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 
instructions, regulations, standards, guidelines, or organizational (mission) 
needs to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
information being processed, stored, or transmitted.32 
In addition, NIST defines security controls as “the safeguards/ countermeasures 
prescribed for information systems or organizations that are designed to: (i) protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that is processed, stored, and 
transmitted by those systems/organizations; and (ii) satisfy a set of defined security 
requirements.”33 Security controls can be procedure based or technology based.34 
Preferably, a security control is carried out and enforced automatically via technology. 
Oftentimes, however, a combination of technology and user-based procedures are 
required to mitigate risks to an acceptable level. 
                                                 
30 Wyatt Kash, “Marines Break from Ranks with BYOD Test,” InformationWeek, April 25, 2014, 
http://www.informationweek.com/government/mobile-and-wireless/marines-break-from-ranks-with-byod-
test/d/d-id/1234840. 
31 Anderson, September 23, 2014. 
32 Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, and National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(U.S.), Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (NIST Special 
Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4) (Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, 2013), B–23, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ 
NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf. 
33 Ibid., 1. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
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With the goal of developing a viable BYOD user agreement in support of USMC 
efforts, this chapter describes the efforts that were expended to identify those end-user 
security controls (or guidelines) necessary to address the security requirements specified 
previously. It is difficult to create a BYOD policy based on acceptable user behavior 
alone. For example, various controls should also be presented within a user agreement to 
inform the BYOD participants of technological capabilities that will enforce acceptable 
use, as well as privacy concerns, such as details regarding organizational monitoring and 
the conditions under which the organization will remotely perform a secure wipe of a 
BYOD device. Therefore, the proposed agreement provided as a result of this research 
includes a range of policy controls beyond just acceptable use and procedural guidelines. 
It was not the intent of this research to create a list of all security controls for BYOD 
devices, but it did require a thorough look at the current set of possibilities to provide the 
end user with an informed decision about participating in a BYOD program. 
A. MARINE CORPS PILOT PROGRAM 
Starting in January 2015 and at the behest of the USMC, the Marine Corps 
Network Operations and Security Center (MCNOSC) began a four-month-long test to 
prove it can “deliver a secure, corporate-managed operating environment on personally 
owned, commercially available smartphones while also meeting the government’s legal 
requirements.”35 To support testing, AT&T and Sprint/ViaSat provided devices, voice, 
and data plans.36 These tests were originally scheduled to commence in May 2014, but 
have since been pushed to accommodate necessary engineering review boards and to free 
up the necessary resources.37 The main purpose of this first round of tests is to identify 
various security issues associated with data-at-rest, data-in-transit, and the ability of the 
vendor-provided solutions to establish and maintain separate work and personal 
                                                 
35 Wyatt Kash, “Marines Break from Ranks with BYOD Test,” InformationWeek, April 25, 2014, 
http://www.informationweek.com/government/mobile-and-wireless/marines-break-from-ranks-with-byod-
test/d/d-id/1234840. 
36 Robert Anderson (Chief of the Vision and Strategy Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 
Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4), Washington, DC), in discussion with the 
author, December 30, 2014. 
37 Ibid. 
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instantiations within a device.38 Another key factor within these initial tests includes the 
evaluation of how derived public key infrastructure (PKI) credentials can be loaded onto 
a personally owned device and incorporated into the organizational container to support 
secure remote authentication.39 
The two carriers only provided a total of 16 iOS and Android devices to support 
the testing, and although the Marine Corps plans to limit its BYOD program to these 
device types initially, additional device types will be allowed to participate in the 
future.40 However, Microsoft devices will not likely be allowed to participate due to 
identified personal privacy issues associated with Microsoft’s mobile OS.41 Based on the 
success of this initial test, the USMC will then begin a six-month follow-on test 
consisting of 500 devices, which is scheduled to begin mid-2015.42 Depending on the 
outcome of this pilot program, the USMC plans to make the BYOD program available to 
units in garrison.43 Tactical use of personally owned devices is not authorized; thus, an 
alternate approach to tactical mobile devices is being sought.44 
A description of the USMC’s technological approach to implementing a BYOD 
program is described in the following subsections to ensure familiarity with the solutions 
for which the proposed user agreement is intended to support. 
1. USMC BYOD Technology Decisions 
At the time of this research, the USMC had decided on the initial vendor-provided 
technological solutions to be evaluated with respect to its BYOD program; however, two 
decisions remain: (1) which vendor solution offers the most cost effective and secure 
organizational instantiation on the device, as described in the next subsection; and (2) the 
                                                 
38 Kash, “Marines Break from Ranks with BYOD Test.” 
39 Ibid. 




44 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Department (C4), Marine Corps Commercial 
Mobile Device Strategy, 3. 
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best approach to remotely manage applications, referred to as mobile application 
management (MAM). The latter is a broader DOD issue to resolve, which the USMC will 
follow once a solution is determined, whereas the former has been narrowed to three 
possible solutions that will be determined during the remainder of the pilot program. It is 
important to emphasize that this research did not try to determine the best technological 
solution, but instead tried to identify the potential impact on the end user of the different 
approaches so that those impacts can be openly conveyed to the end user in an agreement. 
2. Separation Solutions under Evaluation 
The USMC is piloting a container (or sandbox) approach to separate 
organizational data from personal data on a device. A secure container is a separate, 
partitioned, and secure environment on a mobile device in which to run corporate 
applications and store related sensitive corporate data.45 The USMC’s BYOD container 
consists of a mobile application that contains a virtual private network (VPN) connector 
and derived certificate for authentication.46 The challenge and concern with this approach 
is that the container is inherently dependent on the integrity and security of the 
underlying native OS. Thus, if applications can somehow bypass the OS security, or if 
the user can modify or replace the OS (known as rooting or jailbreaking the device), OS 
integrity is compromised, as is the security and separation of the personal and 
organizational instantiations.47 Although rooting typically refers to an Android mobile 
OS, and jailbreaking refers to Apple’s iOS, the concepts are similar enough that a 
detailed breakdown is not required to make the point, as it pertains to the potential 
security impacts associated with BYOD. Rooting or jailbreaking a device means that the 
user bypasses the manufacturer or mobile carrier security restrictions, thus elevating user 
privileges and access to enable the user to alter settings, install otherwise unauthorized 
                                                 
45 Robert Anderson (chief of the Vision and Strategy Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 
Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4), Washington, DC), in discussion with the 
author, May 16, 2014. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
third-party software and applications, as well as modify the OS and file systems.48 The 
container implementations being evaluated by the USMC have root detection capabilities; 
therefore, it is not an unchecked vulnerability. However, the root detection capability is 
not 100 percent effective.49 
AT&T’s solution, called Toggle (version 4.0), creates a separate organizational 
instantiation on a personally owned or government furnished device. This solution is 
preferable to the USMC because devices can be managed from a cloud-based Toggle 
portal and does not require centralized mobile device management (MDM).50 USMC 
administrators can log into the Toggle portal to manage users, applications, 
configurations, and policies, which can be set to prevent the copying or movement of 
organizational data to the personal side of the device and vice versa.51 Additionally, 
AT&T’s Toggle solution is mobile carrier agnostic and works on all common mobile 
device types.52 A USMC BYOD participant will be able to download the Toggle 
application from the relevant application store. Registration of the device is then 
accomplished via an organization provided client access license, which the BYOD 
participant must enter into the Toggle application prior to activation.53 
Secure Work Space is the solution offered by Blackberry. This solution is very 
similar to Toggle in that it is carrier agnostic and will work with most common device 
types.54 However, Secure Work Space requires centralized MDM and the Blackberry 
enterprise infrastructure vice the purely web-based management capability associated 
48 Whitson Gordon, “Everything You Need to Know About Rooting Your Android Phone,” 
Lifehacker, September 4, 2013, http://lifehacker.com/5789397/the-always-up-to-date-guide-to-rooting-any-
android-phone; Liane Cassavoy, “What Does It Mean to Jailbreak an iPhone?,” About Technology, 
accessed June 4, 2014, http://cellphones.about.com/od/glossary/f/jailbreak_faq.htm; Souppaya, Scarfone 
and National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile 
Devices in the Enterprise, 4. 
49 Ryan Fetterman (Vision and Strategy Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command, 
Control, Communications and Computers (C4), Washington, DC), email message to the author, August 26, 
2014. 
50 Anderson, December 30, 2014. 
51 Ibid.; Kash, “Marines Break from Ranks with BYOD Test.” 
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with Toggle.55 Like Toggle, Secure Work Space uses AES 256-bit encryption and meets 
FIPS 140-2 security requirements for cryptographic modules.56, 
Sprint and ViaSat’s joint solution is called Knox/Excide. This solution is 
associated with Samsung’s security enhancement (SE) for Android mobile OS with 
additional security and management hooks provided by the ViaSat Excide technology.57, 
This solution also creates a secure organizational container on a personally owned device, 
offers a myriad of security options, and applies automatic security updates to the SE for 
Android OS to counter software bugs and malicious code or applications.58 It is similar to 
a Type-1 hypervisor in that it resides below the OS on a mobile device.59 Knox also 
employs a trusted boot process that works like a trusted platform module (TPM) to ensure 
the device is trustworthy and has not been altered.60, The trusted boot process works in 
conjunction with a TrustZone-based Integrity Measurement Architecture, which 
continually verifies kernel integrity.61 Additionally, this solution has been granted the 
authority to operate (ATO) on sensitive DOD enterprise networks.62 Although the most 
                                                 
55 “Secure Work Space for iOS and Android,” accessed December 30, 2014, http://us.blackberry.com/ 
content/dam/blackBerry/pdf/business/english/bfb/Secure-Work-Space-datasheet.pdf.  
56 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules (Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2) (Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001), http://csrc.nist.gov/ 
publicationsfips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf; Corsec Security, Inc., AT&T Toggle Cryptographic Security 
Module, Software Version: 1.0, FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy (San Antonio, TX: AT&T 
Services, Inc., 2014), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2112.pdf; 
Ronen Halevy, “BlackBerry Secure Workspace for iOS & Android Gets FIPS 120-2 Certification,” 
BerryReview, March 26, 2014, http://www.berryreview.com/2014/03/26/blackberry-secure-workspace-for-
ios-android-gets-fips-120-2-certification/. 
57 “Technical Details,” accessed December 30, 2014, https://www.samsungknox.com/en/products/ 
knox-workspace/technical; Anderson, December 30, 2014. 
58 “Verizon Wireless Cell Phones: What Is SE Android??,” accessed December 28, 2014, http://www. 
samsung.com/us/support/faq/FAQ00057510/75485/SCH-I545ZWAVZW.  
59 Calvin Azuri, “Samsung KNOX Hypervisor Receives Approval for Use by U.S. Department of 
Defense,” TMCnet.com, March 18, 2014, http://technews.tmcnet.com/channels/enterprise-mobile-
solutions/articles/373702-samsung-knox-hypervisor-receives-approval-use-us-department.htm. 
60 “Technical Details”; “Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary,” accessed December 29, 2014, 
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/trusted_platform_module_tpm_summary.  
61 “Verizon Wireless Cell Phones: What Is SE Android??.” 
62 Azuri, “Samsung KNOX Hypervisor Receives Approval for Use by U.S. Department of Defense.” 
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secure solution of the three, it currently only works with Samsung devices running the SE 
for Android OS. 
The USMC also considered another combined Sprint and ViaSat solution. This 
ViaSat solution is different from Excide and was delivered to the Marine Corps Systems 
Command for a Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration, which is referred to as 
“trusted handheld” (TH2) by the vendor.63 TH2 provides separation using a type-1 
hypervisor solution, which leverages virtualization technology to partition and create 
separate personalities on a single device. This solution allows two instances of the mobile 
operating system to run in parallel, and partitions all processes and resources. One OS 
instance supports the personal side of the device while the other instance supports the 
organizational side. However, this solution has not been deemed as cost effective or 
practical for the USMC’s BYOD program because deployment of the hypervisor to the 
hardware of each personally owned device is difficult to accomplish and original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are not providing it to the general consumer base.64 
3. USMC Approach to Mobile Device Management 
All the solutions to data separation, as previously described, create separate work 
and personal instantiations within one device. To manage the enterprise instances of such 
mobile devices, the USMC would rather not be involved in hosting the management 
solution on premises and are instead leveraging industry-based cloud solutions.65 To 
support this approach, the USMC has talked with commercial mobile carrier companies 
to develop an implementation plan that will allow the USMC to outsource the 
management portal as a cloud-based service, which incorporates the USMC’s system 
security policies.66 In this BYOD model, the management portal will be alerted if device 
                                                 
63 Anderson, September 23, 2014. 
64 Anderson, December 30, 2014. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Nicole Grim, “Marine Corps Mobile Device Strategy Looks to Cut Costs,” Defense Systems, July 
26, 2013, http://defensesystems.com/Articles/2013/07/26/Marine-Corps-mobile-device-strategy.aspx? 
Page=1. 
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settings are altered or if the device is outside acceptable risk levels, and will 
automatically notify the USMC enterprise service helpdesk.67 
The USMC’s separation solutions under evaluation meet the security 
requirements for cryptographic modules set forth in the Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2 for all cryptographic operations to provide 
confidentiality for data-at-rest and data-in-transit.68, 
B. BENEFITS OF SEPARATION 
Those technical solutions that provide a separation of work and personal instances 
on a device provide benefits for both the employer and the employee. 
Since organizational data is accessed, processed, transmitted, and stored within 
the organizational container, the data remains under the control of the organization. This 
situation creates an environment in which the user must adhere to USMC BYOD policies 
while utilizing the organizational container because the USMC owns that container, while 
allowing the user to have a different behavior when utilizing the personal container. 
Therefore, many common policy controls associated with employee use of organizational 
IT resources are inherited by and applicable to the use of the organizational container 
resident on an employee’s personally owned mobile device. The primary employee 
benefit of a BYOD program is the capability for employees to gain remote access to 
organizational data when and where they need it. However, user behavior while working 
within the organizational side of a mobile device should be no different from sitting in a 
physical office utilizing government IT resources. 
Another added benefit to the USMC is that the organizational container solution 
eases some of the considerations associated with legal holds and data discovery, such as 
subpoenas and the spillage of sensitive information. As defined by the Electronic 
Discovery Reference Model (EDRM), a legal hold “is a communication issued as a result 
of current or anticipated litigation, audit, government investigation or other such matter 
                                                 
67 Anderson, September 23, 2014. 
68 Ibid; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules. 
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that suspends the normal disposition or processing of records.”69  Furthermore, a legal 
hold acts as the first step in the electronic discovery process to inform employees that 
they must “preserve documents and electronically stored information (ESI) associated 
with an investigation, lawsuit, or audit.”70 
The benefit of having two instantiations or containers is that it completely 
separates organizational functions and data from the personal side of the device. This 
solution also aims to ensure user privacy as the USMC will only be able to monitor the 
organizational or work side of the device. In addition, if the device is lost or 
compromised, or if the employee leaves the organization, the organization can only delete 
the organization’s data. 
The next section describes the BYOD technology and user policy solutions 
adopted by three case study organizations. Additional privacy considerations and best 
practices identified from the following case study organizations are covered in Chapter 
III. 
C. CASE STUDIES 
To gain a better understanding regarding how the Marine Corps’ primary security 
requirements can be addressed through user policy, three BYOD implementation 
program case studies are described in this subsection. These non-DOD case study 
organizations have utilized different technological solutions to implement their BYOD 
programs; however, a comparison of each implementation and its associated user policy 
provides insight regarding what policies may be applicable to the USMC’s BYOD user 
policies and technological solutions under evaluation. Despite the different technological 
solutions employed, numerous similarities exist between each organization’s user 
policies. These similarities provide a base line of common controls, which can be applied 
to the proposed USMC BYOD user agreement as a starting point for establishing the 
security capabilities necessary to meet the USMC’s security requirements. 
                                                 
69 EDRM, “EDRM Metrics Glossary,” accessed March 9, 2015, http://www.edrm.net/resources/ 
glossaries/edrm-metrics. 
70  “Legal Hold,” accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.symantec.com/page.jsp?id=eic-legal-hold. 
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To identify lessons learned and best practices regarding user policy and privacy 
considerations associated with BYOD implementations, two non-DOD government 
agencies—the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—have been researched. Additionally, 
information from a consumer packaged goods (CPG) firm was gathered to compare 
practices within the private business sector. Although the firm has been extremely helpful 
and forthcoming regarding its BYOD program, the name of this CPG is not disclosed to 
support its desire to maintain anonymity and not directly disclose or associate BYOD 
policies and practices. From both a technology and capability standpoint, each of the case 
study organizations has implemented its BYOD programs differently. 
The CPG’s and EEOC’s programs provide a basic ability to synchronize mobile 
devices with organizational email, contacts, calendars, and tasks, whereas TTB provides 
full access to network data and applications via a virtual desktop approach. These three 
BYOD programs differ from the solutions being evaluated by the USMC. Due to these 
differences, a user policy or user agreement associated with the case study organizations 
cannot be simply adapted or combined with any hope of addressing all the USMC’s 
BYOD security requirements. 
Appendix A provides a detailed list of the case study organizations’ user policy 
controls and the security requirement each control supports. Within Appendix A, each 
case study user policy control is also mapped to the applicable NIST SP-800-53 
control(s), which is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. The following case study 
BYOD program descriptions focus primarily on those user policy controls and solutions 
that best support the three security requirements as identified by the USMC. 
As a point of clarification, user agreements are commonly referred to as Rules of 
Behavior (RoB). For instance, both the TTB and EEOC refer to their user agreements as 
RoB. To avoid confusion and for the purpose of this research, they will be referred to as 
user agreements. 
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1. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau  
The TTB has implemented a BYOD solution utilizing a Citrix virtual desktop 
implementation. The Citrix virtual desktop uses a small browser plugin called Citrix 
Receiver, which is freely available for download and turns almost any device into a thin 
client.71 A thin client refers to any computer or computing device that relies on a separate 
computer (or server) to handle the actual computational workload. The device operating 
as a thin client serves only as a means to allow for user inputs via a keyboard, mouse, or 
touch screen, and as a means to display data through a monitor. This solution was 
selected because the Citrix Receiver allows the TTB to leverage established network 
infrastructure to create thin client devices readily and support BYOD.72 Citrix Receiver is 
similar to remote desktop in that it displays and controls a virtual desktop on the user 
device while all the computing is done within TTB’s data center. Communication is 
accomplished via independent computing architecture (ICA) protocol for Citrix Virtual 
desktop, whereas remote desktop protocol (RDP) is the protocol for remote desktop.73 
Using a virtual desktop to support BYOD allows for centralized management of the 
mobile devices. With respect to separation, the virtual desktop can be configured to 
disallow the copying of data from TTB’s data center to a personal device and vice 
versa.74  
Additionally, discovery in support of subpoenas can be easily conducted on a 
single disk array within the TTB’s data center as opposed to many local hard drives 
dispersed throughout the country.75 Simply stated, a user on a mobile device accesses a 
virtual desktop environment from a smart phone or tablet, but all data remains locked in 
the organizational data center. Other advantages to the TTB’s implementation are that the 
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Citrix Receiver is device agnostic and runs very efficiently in limited bandwidth 
environments.76 
One of the issues the TTB had to address by utilizing this technological solution 
was form factor. The virtual desktop creates a personal computer (PC) environment. 
Thus, users accessing the virtual desktop from a Mac (Apple) product must become 
accustomed to utilizing their Mac hardware within this PC environment. User feedback 
has indicated that within a couple weeks, Mac users have been able to adapt to this form 
factor challenge and have reacted positively.77 This approach has also proven flexible 
enough to support teleworkers putting home computers on par with the systems and 
network environment easily, as if working in an office physically located on TTB 
premises.78 Arguably, the most significant benefit to the TTB’s implementation is that it 
allows the TTB to minimize legal considerations and the inherent delays associated with 
resolving issues that would otherwise require substantial legal involvement.79 
To address the secure remote authentication requirement, the TTB utilizes two-
factor authentication for all remote access.80 Two-factor authentication to the VPN is 
accomplished by providing a RSA secure identification (ID) code and personal 
identification number (PIN).81 Without the combination of these two factors, any attempt 
to establish a VPN connection is denied. This technical control is coupled with various 
additional policy controls to include requiring users to protect authentication credentials; 
reporting lost or compromised credentials; and disallowing any remote connections to 
TTB networks from outside of the United States.82 
Mobile device OS integrity is a risk that the TTB has addressed through user 
policy, which states, “do not install or use unauthorized hardware or software…do not 
                                                 




80 Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Remote Access Policy (7320.1G) (Washington, DC: 
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, 2011). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
exchange system components…only use TTB provided and properly configured 
equipment and software.”83 However, the TTB has no technological solution in place to 
enforce the policy.84 TTB policy requires users to install patches when available and also 
assigns the user the responsibility to maintain and update antivirus software.85 This 
policy is required for both home computer and mobile devices used to access the TTB 
network. Furthermore, the policy also stipulates that if an operating system is no longer 
supported (e.g., Windows 98, 2000, and XP), it cannot be used to access the VPN.86 In 
both home computer and mobile device cases, no scan or quarantine solution is available 
that looks at the connecting host devices because no solution has been identified that will 
work and be manageable for the TTB.87 In short, mobile device OS integrity is the 
primary risk for the TTB’s BYOD program.88 A portion of the risk associated with the 
TTB’s approach is trusting that the Citrix solution can enforce a separation policy.89 
However, the TTB believes that the potential risk to the organization’s information and 
network is mitigated to an acceptable level via this thin client approach and the associated 
user agreements.90 
Control and protection of organizational networks and data is primarily 
accomplished via the TTB’s Citrix virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) solution. From a 
personally owned device, employees can connect to the TTB network through the TTB 
web-based secure socket layer (SSL) VPN utilizing the two-factor authentication method 
previously discussed.91 The VDI prevents users from saving any data from the TTB’s 
83 Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, TTB IT Security Rules of Behavior (Washington, DC: 
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau TTB, n.d.). 
84 Robert Hughes (Chief Information Officer, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), 
Washington, DC), email message to the author, October 27, 2014. 
85 Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Remote Access Policy.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Hughes, October 27, 2014. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Robert Hughes (Chief Information Officer, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), 
Washington, DC), email message to the author, December 30, 2014. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Remote Access Policy. 
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data centers to the personally owned device and vice versa. This solution ensures 
organizational control of data because it remains within the TTB’s data centers. 
Additional user guidelines are identified within the TTB’s user policy, some of which 
overlap with the controls in place to ensure secure remote authentication. The web 
browser on any device used to access the TTB VPN must be capable of at least 128-bit 
encryption and is enforced via Netscaler VPN technology.92, Additionally, any device not 
recognized as “trusted” based on proper configuration and up-to-date patches is not 
allowed to access the TTB network.93 Furthermore, sensitive or PII must be encrypted 
prior to transmission outside of the TTB environment.94 User policy also supports the 
control and protection of organizational data and networks by prohibiting employees 
from making any attempt to bypass these remote access or control mechanisms.95 
Although guidelines are identified within the TTB’s user policy to control and 
protect organizational networks and data, the TTB has very few technical capabilities to 
back up these policy controls. Again, the TTB has no way to monitor the configuration of 
devices to discern what software is on the device, and then allow or disallow a connection 
based on compliance with its remote access policy.96 The TTB’s technological solution 
only prevents the transfer of data from the organizational data centers to a personally 
owned device and the transfer of personal data to the organizational data centers. 
2. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  
The EEOC refers to its BYOD program as “managed BYOD” and allows a user to 
synchronize a mobile device for organizational email, contacts, calendars, tasks, and open 
a variety of attachment formats.97 Based on user demand, the EEOC currently supports 
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only Android, Apple iOS-based and Blackberry devices.98 If an employee chooses to 
participate, EEOC’s administrator adds the specific device and username to the 
administrative console on the Globo Mobile MDM console, and the device is 
subsequently activated.99 The administrator then sends an email to the user with 
instructions for phone setup to include the download and installation of the Globo Mobile 
MDM and TouchDown applications from the device’s relevant app store (e.g., Apple’s 
App Store for iOS, Google Play for Android, etc.) and identifies specific settings that 
must be established prior to synchronization.100 Proper device configuration is validated 
via the MDM administrative console.101 This process serves two purposes. First, it 
correlates the participant to a specific personally owned device, and second, it serves as a 
form of network access control (NAC). The NAC consists of protocols put in place to 
check the configuration and security of an endpoint device when it is initially connected 
to a network. Although the device can only be utilized to access limited resources within 
the EEOC enterprise (i.e., the exchange server), the NAC does verify the endpoint device 
matches the intended user and is properly configured prior to allowing access to EEOC 
enterprise services. 
Since unlimited remote access to the EEOC data centers is not allowed for 
standard BYOD participants, the primary security requirement in this case is control and 
protection of organizational data accessible via EEOC enterprise services (i.e., email). 
The EEOC provides two methods for employees to access organizational email and 
calendar services. The first is web-based access to GroupWise, while the second option is 
the use of an organizational container application.102 For web-based access, 
organizational emails are accessed via a web browser and Internet connection. In this 
                                                 
98 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Bring Your Own Device—Policy and Rules of 
Behavior, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) fv1c (Washington, DC: U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 2012). 
99 Kimberly Hancher (Chief Information Officer, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), Washington, DC), in discussion with the author, October 31, 2014. 
100 Ibid; J. Scott Walker, (Enterprise Sales Manager, Globo Mobile Technologies Inc., Palo Alto, CA), 
in discussion with the author, December 15, 2014. 
101 Walker, December 15, 2014. 
102 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Bring Your Own Device—Policy and Rules of 
Behavior. 
 28 
instance, emails and associated attachments are not downloaded by default to the 
personally owned device.103 However, no technical controls are in place to prevent a user 
from inadvertently or intentionally downloading organizational information and 
attachments to a personally owned device. This being the case, the EEOC must rely on 
the user’s adherence to policy to protect organizational information accessed via 
GroupWise. For example, the EEOC’s user policy stipulates that although the “user will 
not download or transfer sensitive business data to their personal devices…participants 
must routinely delete any sensitive business files that may be present on the device as a 
result of an inadvertent download.”104 
The second option for accessing EEOC services is through a container 
application, which provides the capability to control organizational data. The EEOC 
utilizes TouchDown as its container solution to separate the personal side of the device 
from organizational emails, downloaded attachments, contacts, calendars, and tasks.105 
Organizational emails and attachments are downloaded and stored on the personally 
owned device, but remain within the TouchDown container. Additionally, this container 
solution allows the EEOC to conduct a selective remote wipe of only the organizational 
data vice a complete wipe of the device.106 TouchDown employs advanced encryption 
standard (AES) 256-bit encryption to protect data-at-rest within the container and 
prevents the movement of data from the organizational container to the personal side of 
the device and vice versa.107 Assuming a BYOD participant adheres to the user policies 
when utilizing the web-based access option, and only utilizes the TouchDown container 
to download organizational data; the organizational data is effectively controlled and 
protected. As an added layer of protection and control of organizational data, BYOD 
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participants must agree that the personally owned device will not be shared with anyone 
else to include family members.108 
To participate in EEOC’s BYOD program, participants must use a properly 
configured device based on EEOC defined security settings and an associated password 
that then grants permission to use EEOC services.109 The password is enforced through 
the MDM solution and is required to gain access to the device, but no subsequent 
passwords are required once access to the device is achieved.110 Globo Mobile serves as 
EEOC’s MDM solution and employs technical capabilities to prevent misconfigured 
devices from using EEOC services.111 Through the MDM, the EEOC maintains the 
ability to conduct a selective remote wipe or a full wipe on a device if it is reported lost 
or stolen. Remote wipes are initiated and subsequently confirmed via the MDM 
administrative console.112 Additionally, all organizational email and data resident within 
the TouchDown container will be automatically deleted following 25 failed password 
attempts.113 Remote wipes are also conducted on devices removed or transferred out of 
the BYOD program.114 Whether lost, stolen, or transferred, the devices are also removed 
from the MDM console.115 It is important to note that remote wipes are not a reliable 
security control because an attacker can access information stored on a device before it is 
wiped.116 Thieves can potentially bypass logical access controls or steal an unlocked 
device. Thieves are also quick to disallow connectivity to the device by placing it in 
airplane mode, putting it in a box or bag that makes it impossible to receive the remote 
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wipe signal, or simply turn it off until the resident data can be exploited at a later time.117 
Additionally, BYOD participants may not realize the device is lost for several hours or 
may wait days to report a lost or stolen device, which creates a window of vulnerability 
for organizational data.118 Still, the ability to initiate remote wipes is an important 
additional layer of protection for organizational data.119 However, from the user point of 
view, the ability to wipe personal data and applications remotely may be alarming, and 
result in a lower BYOD acceptance than anticipated. 
In addition to detection technology, the EEOC also addresses personally owned 
mobile device OS integrity through a user policy that prohibits participants from 
installing unauthorized third-party software or attempting to jailbreak the device.120 
Policies are set within the MDM administrative console for application management.121 
If EEOC BYOD participants download an unauthorized application to their personally 
owned device or attempts to remove required applications, an alert is sent to EEOC 
administrators or directly to the participants notifying them that if not corrected, the 
ability to continue BYOD privileges will be terminated.122 Policy also assigns users the 
responsibility to apply patches and updates in a timely fashion to maintain an up-to-date 
defensive posture.123 MDM technical solutions support these user policy controls by 
maintaining the capability to identify and prevent the use of EEOC services for devices 
not within standards.124 
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In addition to the more general Globo Mobile solution, a VPN connection to 
access EEOC’s network is provided to a limited number of privileged users primarily 
consisting of executive level leadership and is approved on a case-by-case basis by the 
chief information officer (CIO).125 The number of privileged users is small enough that 
monitoring is limited to identifying rogue device access.126 The EEOC only allows 
personally owned iOS devices to establish VPN connections. EEOC BYOD 
administrators manually monitor rogue devices by looking for non-iOS devices or 
devices that do not correlate to a specific user authorized to establish a VPN 
connection.127 The MDM is not involved with any aspect of the EEOC’s VPN remote 
access solution. 
Those senior executives allowed to establish VPN connections with personally 
owned iOS devices must receive additional mobile device awareness training and can 
only use EEOC approved and configured Cisco VPN client software.128 To establish 
these connections and support secure remote authentication, EEOC administrators must 
be allowed to install mobile device management tools, as well as an anti-virus security 
suite—that consists of a firewall, anti-virus software, and website protector 
applications—on the personal device.129 A second username and password, in addition to 
the initial device access password, is also required for remote authentication.130 
3. Consumer Packaged Goods Firm 
Since only a limited number of government BYOD implementations have been 
established, a private sector program, which has requested anonymity, has also been 
included in this research. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names 
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of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. According to the company’s website 
accessed on August 11, 2014, this CPG is one of the world’s leading food manufacturers, 
and is well known for a myriad of products. The CPG’s BYOD program is similar to the 
EEOC’s program in that it provides employees the ability to synchronize corporate email, 
calendars, contacts and notes, and does not allow participants full access to corporate data 
centers.131 The CPG’s implementation of BYOD also allows for the utilization of 
Microsoft Lync to support instant messaging.132 Remote access to the CPG’s corporate 
data centers is only allowed using corporate furnished equipment consisting of iOS 
products that will not be described further in this thesis, as it falls outside the bounds of a 
BYOD program. 
Based on discussions with a company representative, the CPG utilizes MobileIron 
as its MDM solution to support BYOD, which is downloaded to employee devices from 
relevant vendor application stores and is available for most of the common mobile device 
types.133 The user then registers the device with the corporate MobileIron account. After 
an employee requests to participate in the BYOD program, the employee reads and 
agrees to the CPG’s user policy, downloads the MobileIron application, and is ready to 
work; a relatively simple and streamlined process.134 Like EEOC, this process correlates 
a CPG participant to a specific personally owned device. 
Similar to the EEOC’s BYOD program for standard users, the CPG allows limited 
access to enterprise resources (i.e., exchange servers) from a personally owned device.135 
To address the security requirement for control and protection of organizational data, the 
CPG user policy stipulates that the user can only backup corporate data to a corporate 
device.136 Therefore, BYOD participants must exercise caution when conducting a 
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backup of personal data resident on their device to a home computer or another 
personally owned device to ensure company data is not also transferred to a non-
organizational device. The CPG does not have any technological controls in place to 
prevent the backup of corporate data to non-corporate devices, and is therefore, based 
solely on user adherence to policy.137 The CPG policy requires that sensitive company 
data present on a personally owned device must be encrypted and password protected, 
and participants must agree to periodically delete any unnecessary information stored on 
the device.138 Furthermore, backing up corporate data to third-party file sharing and 
Internet backup services, such as iCloud and Dropbox, is prohibited.139 Operational 
security (OPSEC) principles are also addressed through user policy and warn participants 
that separate pieces of information can be consolidated to create a detailed picture of 
sensitive activities.140 The CPG has not implemented technological solutions to create 
separate work and personal instantiations, and thus, cannot prevent the commingling of 
organizational and personal data.141 
The CPG’s user policy stipulates that employees must let the company know 
immediately if a device is lost or stolen, at which point the CPG can leverage MobileIron 
to wipe the device remotely.142 Personally owned devices will also be wiped following 
10 unsuccessful attempts to access the device.143 If an employee separates from the CPG, 
the company service desk will initiate a remote wipe of the personally owned device, but 
will seek to delete only company data.144 However, because the CPG is not utilizing a 
container approach to separate personal and organizational data, conducting a selective 
wipe will prove challenging. For this reason, the CPG includes verbiage within its user 
policy to inform BYOD participants, “personal information stored on your personally 
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owned device might be permanently lost or made unavailable due to a wipe of the 
device…”145 
The CPG’s policy further forbids the download or installation of unauthorized 
third-party software and will quarantine any device with non-standard add-ins to unlock 
or jailbreak the device.146 To enforce this control, the CPG’s MDM solution has the 
capability to detect unauthorized software. Although this control is stated in the CPG user 
policy, in actuality, the CPG does not manage or restrict applications that an associate 
might install on his personally owned device.147 Instead, the CPG relies on a “user 
responsibility principle” (e.g., users must be responsible for their systems and the ability 
to perform their jobs with the provided tools).148 However, technical solutions are in 
place through the MDM to identify improperly configured devices, as well as devices 
with a compromised OS.149 The detection of configuration changes occurs on the device 
via the MobileIron application, which periodically synchronizes to the MobileIron 
administrative console.150 Any alterations to the device are simultaneously passed to the 
administrative console during these periodic communications, which subsequently alert 
the CPG BYOD administrators and the participant if a device is outside of acceptable 
parameters.151 Furthermore, only BYOD administrators can remove the MDM 
application from a personally owned device.152 
Although the CPG does not utilize the full container capabilities offered by 
MobileIron, the MobileIron MDM application itself has jailbreak detection 
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capabilities.153 In this case, if the user successfully jailbreaks the device, the MobileIron 
application will immediately detect the OS alterations and automatically remove all local 
copies of organizational data within the MDM container application, which essentially 
wipes the device of all corporate information without a connection to the MDM 
administrative console.154 Once a connection to the administrative console is re-
established, further security measures can be taken depending on the organization’s 
established security policies.155 However, because the CPG is not utilizing the full 
capabilities offered by MobileIron, this automatic removal of organizational data resident 
on the device would not be accomplished. Instead, the CPG relies on a wireless 
connection to the device, and if a participant alters or disables the CPG prescribed 
settings, the participant’s service to the personally owned device will be suspended and a 
full remote wipe will be executed.156 Remote wipes initiated via the CPG’s MobileIron 
MDM solution are susceptible to the same connectivity issues as those discussed in the 
EEOC section. Like the EEOC, the CPG assigns the responsibility for applying software 
updates and security patches to the user.157 
The CPG user policy emphasizes physical protection of the device. For example, 
policy guidance directs users to never leave mobile devices in a vehicle nor include 
devices with checked luggage.158 Additionally, if a local government or outside agency 
seizes a participant’s device, the device must be inspected by the organization prior to 
continuing its use to process or access company data.159 To find a lost device, the CPG 
policy also stipulates that the user must leave location services turned on.160 
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D. CASE STUDY COMPARISON TO SUPPORT USMC SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
This section compares the technical and policy controls established by the three 
case study organizations. Although each organization has adopted numerous additional 
user and technical controls, this section focuses on those controls most relevant to 
supporting the three primary security requirements identified by the USMC, which are 
secure remote authentication, OS integrity, and control and protection of organizational 
data and networks. 
1. Security Requirement—Secure Remote Authentication 
The TTB is the only case study organization that allows access to its data centers 
for all BYOD participants. Although the EEOC does allow VPN connections to the 
organizational network, this access is limited to a small group of privileged users. 
Controls common among these two case study organizations to support secure remote 
authentication include at least one-factor authentication. The TTB requires two-factor 
authentication via a RSA ID and PIN. The EEOC’s requirement to first register a device 
to ensure it correlates to a specific user, as well as the installation of various 
configuration software, does provide a level of added protection, but it still relies on a 
single factor for remote authentication.161, Although the EEOC employs one-factor 
authentication, one password is required to initially access the device, and a separate 
second username and password is required to establish a VPN connection.162 The ability 
to identify whether a device is authorized access to EEOC data centers must be 
accomplished manually, which makes it probable that an unauthorized access, however 
unlikely, will only be discovered after the fact. The CPG only allows VPN connections to 
its corporate data centers using corporate furnished equipment consisting of iOS 
products. Since the CPG’s BYOD approach only allows limited access to enterprise 
services, a comparison of its remote authentication practices is not discussed. However, 
the CPG does require a 4-digit PIN for logical access to a personally owned device used 
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within its BYOD program, and enforces this requirement through the MDM 
application.163 
2. Security Requirement—OS Integrity 
The EEOC and the CPG use a centralized MDM approach to monitor personally 
owned mobile devices to ensure proper configuration and OS integrity. Both MDM 
solutions maintain the capability to manage applications, can see when unauthorized 
applications have been installed, and when required applications have been removed. 
Furthermore, the MDMs can detect devices outside of organizational defined risk 
parameters and will quarantine these devices to deny continued access to enterprise 
services. The CPG takes this a step further by initiating a remote wipe of the devices with 
improper configuration settings or a compromised OS.164 The TTB recognizes mobile 
OS integrity as a risk within its BYOD program, but has not identified a manageable 
technological solution to monitor or counter this vulnerability.165 However, the TTB’s 
thin client approach to BYOD does reduce the potential harm associated with this 
vulnerability. All three case study organizations require users to keep the original OS 
current by applying patches and security updates when available.166  
Although the aforementioned controls are all technical approaches employed to 
either prevent or detect a compromised OS, no measurement for how much confidence 
should be placed on such approaches actually exists because none have been submitted to 
a third-party evaluation of their capabilities, such as an evaluation against the Common 
Criteria framework.167 Dependence on these approaches for OS integrity, therefore, 
carries some amount of risk. 
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3. Security Requirement—Control and Protection of Organizational 
Data and Networks 
All three case study organizations use several common controls that would meet 
the USMC requirement to control and protect organizational data and networks. A 
password or PIN is required to access logically any personally owned device used within 
EEOC’s and the CPG’s BYOD programs.168 For data-at-rest, EEOC’s organizational 
container utilizes AES 256-bit encryption; however, complete device encryption is not 
required.169 It is worth noting, however, that iOS and the new Android OS provide full 
device encryption by default utilizing AES 256 and AES 128-bit encryption, 
respectively.170 When used to handle sensitive information, the CPG requires the use of 
encryption for personally owned devices.171 The EEOC and the CPG also maintain the 
capability to initiate a remote wipe of personally owned devices.172 Since TTB’s 
technological solution ensures that organizational data is not stored on a personally 
owned device, this concern is well mitigated and the capability to remote wipe a device is 
not required. 
TTB, EEOC and the CPG policies have controls in place that either prohibit the 
download of sensitive organizational data and PII to a personally owned device or 
requires such organizational data present on the device to be encrypted.173 The EEOC 
and the CPG further require users to delete organizational information periodically that 
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may have been inadvertently downloaded or is no longer needed.174 Unauthorized 
disclosure is also addressed in both TTB’s and the CPG’s user policies, and advises 
participants to exercise caution when using social networking and email services.175 
All three case study organizations clearly state in user policy that users are 
prohibited from downloading or installing unauthorized software; however, only the 
EEOC and the CPG—through their respective MDMs—have the technological solution 
in place to enforce the policy or detect violations.176 
As for the protection of data-in-transit, only the TTB clearly states in its user 
policy that sensitive organizational data must be encrypted prior to transmission outside 
of the TTB environment.177 The EEOC utilizes the proprietary GroupWise encryption for 
internal traffic, which is sufficient, as long as traffic remains within the GroupWise 
environment and is not downloaded to the personal side of a device.178 The CPG 
addresses the transmission of sensitive data through user policy and warns participants to 
exercise caution when utilizing distribution lists or when forwarding emails to ensure 
only individuals with a need-to-know are allowed to view sensitive information.179 
Moreover, the CPG forbids the backup of corporate data to Internet cloud services.180 
Both the EEOC’s and the CPG’s user policies limit the backup of organizational data to 
only organizationally owned devices.181 Other than the authorized devices described in 
each case study organization’s respective programs, the TTB and EEOC have user policy 
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guidelines in place to control the physical connection of privately owned devices to the 
organizational network and systems. The TTB clearly states that privately owned 
equipment will not be connected to TTB systems or networks.182 Whereas, the EEOC 
only allows BYODs with FIPS 140-2 encryption capabilities (only BlackBerry devices 
per EEOC current policy) to be connected to organizational PCs.183 Both the TTB and 
the CPG have user policy controls in place regarding physical protection of personally 
owned devices; however, the CPG stresses this point in the most depth.184 Finally, 
prompt reporting of lost, stolen, or potentially compromised devices and associated 
credentials is required by all case study organizations.185 
Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive government information, as well as the 
spillage of classified information onto personally owned mobile devices, is another area 
of concern for the USMC. Although none of the case study organizations covered in this 
chapter works with classified information, their BYOD programs do address concerns 
associated with the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive organizational data through 
policy. Technical controls previously identified can provide limited response 
mechanisms, but are still inadequate to protect classified information. Additionally, these 
controls often involve operator intervention and comprise only one facet of an 
organization’s incident response plan. Both the TTB and the CPG policies state that users 
must notify their respective information security representatives if an unauthorized 
disclosure or related information security issue is suspected.186 Technical controls to 
prevent or detect the spillage of classified information within the USMC’s BYOD 
program are nonexistent, and must therefore, be addressed through policy (such as a 
prohibition on the use of a device for classified data) and prompt reporting requirements 
so that appropriate action can be taken. 
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All three BYOD programs researched are voluntary with no expectation for 
employee reimbursement. As mentioned, few technological similarities exist between the 
BYOD implementations researched when compared to the technological solutions being 
evaluated by the USMC. Therefore, each organization has implemented different 
compensating user policy security controls based on these technological differences. For 
this reason, the user policies and agreements developed by the TTB, the EEOC and the 
CPG cannot be simply compiled to create a comprehensive user policy for the USMC’s 
BYOD program. Best practices and commonalities to these BYOD program user policies 
can, however, be leveraged as a starting point for establishing a viable user agreement for 
the USMC. Additional stipulations and considerations are required to ensure adherence to 
DOD policies while also tailoring the standards to suit the USMC’s technological 
solutions being considered. 
Personal privacy associated with the use of a personally owned device is the key 
concern for BYOD participants. Striking the proper balance of personal privacy within a 
BYOD program helps ensure that both the organization and participant can benefit from 
the flexibility a BYOD program provides. Therefore, privacy considerations for each case 
study organization have also been reviewed as described in the next chapter. 
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III. BYOD PRIVACY 
A. BYOD PRIVACY DEFINED 
Two fundamental issues within a BYOD program are privacy and the protections 
available when using a personally owned device in a dual use scenario. An organization 
must not only ensure that the device can securely manage organizational information, but 
that safeguards are in place for the personal information residing on a device, not just 
from those outside the organization, but from those managing the device within the 
organization itself. Protection of a user’s privacy is driven by good policy that clearly 
outlines any potential privacy concerns, all while guaranteeing that a user’s expectation 
of privacy is preserved. This situation can be especially challenging because no two 
organizations will have the same information protection policies based on differing 
missions and risk tolerances. Additionally, no two users will view privacy the same 
because of differing life goals, life experiences, and risk tolerances. As a result, it is 
imperative that organizations provide an appropriate level of both security and privacy. 
It is necessary to define the meaning of privacy with respect to this research 
because it can be considered by many to be a contested concept. According to NIST SP-
800-53, “Privacy involves each individual’s right to decide when and whether to share 
personal information, how much information to share, and the particular circumstances 
under which that information can be shared.”187 The NIST SP-800-53 also states, 
“Privacy is more than security, however, and includes, for example, the principles of 
transparency, notice, and choice.”188 These definitions provide a baseline for what rights 
a user should be afforded and approach privacy more from an individual perspective, as 
well as stress that it is the individual’s right to decide what or how much personal 
information to share. Additionally, they offer organizations implementing a BYOD 
program with considerations that must be recognized when a dual use device contains or 
is accessing both personal and corporate data. 
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Evaluation of various definitions regarding privacy found that the NIST SP-800-
53r4 best captures privacy as it relates to a BYOD program. This conclusion was based 
on two critical factors and did not consider any technological solutions that could 
separate personal and corporate data on a device. First, a BYOD program should be 
completely voluntary. An employee should have the right to choose not to participate or 
opt out of a BYOD program if the privacy concerns or other terms and conditions are 
deemed unacceptable. Second, a BYOD program should correctly set the users’ 
expectation of privacy in a BYOD environment. Prior to an enrollment in a BYOD 
program, users should understand the potential privacy concerns associated with 
accessing corporate data on a personally owned device. Users must also recognize that 
some BYOD programs require them to consent to terms that may include monitoring or 
other actions that could lower their expectation of privacy on a personally owned device. 
As a result, users accepting these terms must realize the privacy rights that they are 
surrendering as a result of enrolling in the BYOD program. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
To identify potential privacy considerations that exist within different BYOD 
programs, research was conducted on current policies and practices from two non-DOD 
government agencies and one commercial sector entity as outlined in Chapter II. The 
information gathered provided lessons learned with respect to privacy, as well as insight 
into how the different organizations have overcome concerns pertaining to the protection 
of user privacy. Additionally, the case studies offer potential implementation models for 
the USMC to consider throughout the testing phase of their BYOD pilot program. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the ways that the CPG firm, the EEOC, and the TTB 
have implemented their BYOD programs differ. This distinction is important to note 
because regardless of how their programs were implemented, organizations need to 
understand that by statute, employees are entitled to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.189 
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1. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau  
To overcome potential privacy concerns within its BYOD program, the TTB has 
implemented a technological solution that utilizes virtualization. As previously discussed, 
the virtualization technology completely isolates TTB’s corporate data from the personal 
user data residing on a device. This concept is important to note from a privacy 
perspective because it highlights that TTB’s data is not stored on the personally owned 
device and no work-related computation is directly performed on the BYOD hardware.190 
Information within TTB’s data center remains resident to the data center, which restricts 
users from copying data from the enterprise to the device and vice versa. The personally 
owned device functions no differently from a normal smartphone or tablet that allows 
users access to all their personal or private information that resides on the device. 
Additionally, this solution guarantees that users’ privacy is protected knowing that the 
TTB has no ability or need to access the device. 
The technological solution that the TTB has implemented within its BYOD 
program serves as an example of how potential privacy concerns on the personal side of a 
device can be mitigated. Furthermore, the virtualization enables the TTB to only manage 
and monitor its data. Another important aspect of the TTB’s BYOD program is that it is 
completely voluntary. As a result, its policy mandates that interested employees sign a 
user agreement prior to enrollment. The user agreement applies only to the corporate 
accessed data and acts as a legal agreement between the TTB and its BYOD users. 
Signing the user agreement means that employees acknowledge that the “Use of the TTB 
systems constitutes consent to monitoring, interception, recording, reading, copying or 
capturing by authorized personnel of all activities.”191 The employees’ consent to the 
aforementioned terms eliminates their expectation of privacy when they utilize the virtual 
desktop to access corporate data and grants the TTB the authority to conduct the 
necessary actions to ensure its corporate data is controlled and protected.  
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2. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  
The EEOC’s managed BYOD program, like the TTB’s program, also employs a 
technological solution to control and protect organizational data. However, these 
solutions are not the same and accordingly require different policy considerations to 
address user privacy concerns. The EEOC leverages a MDM tool provided by Globo 
Mobile that allows the EEOC to easily manage and enforce its security policies on 
registered devices.192 As discussed in Chapter II, the EEOC also provides two methods 
for employees to access EEOC enterprise services, web-based access to GroupWise and 
an organizational container application.193 Although both methods provide registered 
EEOC employees with an easy way to access corporate data on a personally owned 
device, user privacy concerns that exist when accessing data through the container 
application differ from those of GroupWise. As previously discussed, the EEOC utilizes 
TouchDown as its container solution to separate the personal side of the device from 
EEOC enterprise services.194 Enterprise services accessed through TouchDown remain 
resident to the secure container, which prevents the movement of data from the 
organizational container to the personal side of the device and vice versa.195 This solution 
mitigates user privacy concerns by ensuring that corporate data never resides on the 
personal side of the device. Furthermore, the container solution allows the EEOC to 
control organizational data without accessing the personal side of the device, which 
maintains the user’s privacy. 
The alternative method of accessing EEOC enterprise services through web-based 
access to GroupWise does not create a separate secure container. Since no technical 
controls are in place that prevents employees from downloading organizational data when 
utilizing GroupWise to access EEOC services, the potential exists for the commingling of 
organizational and personal data on a personally owned device. This concern is discussed 
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in Chapter II; however, it is important to revisit it based on the potential privacy issues 
that could arise by having organizational data on the personal side of a device. On the 
surface, it appears as a security issue for the organization, not a privacy concern for the 
employee. However, if the organization learns that an employee has violated this policy, 
then the organization will enforce its right (as described in EEOC’s user policy) to look at 
all the data on the personal side of the device to verify that all organizational data has 
been removed, which could result in a loss of privacy with respect to the user’s data. 
EEOC’s user agreement specifically states, “Users will not download or transfer sensitive 
business data to their personal device.”196 To ensure that their data is protected, the 
BYOD participants in the EEOC’s organization are required to read, acknowledge, and 
adhere to the user agreement prior to enrolling. Additionally, employees who accept the 
terms of enrollment are subject to administrative, disciplinary, or legal actions if found to 
be noncompliant or in violation of the policy or user agreement.197 
Another privacy concern that the EEOC recognizes within its user agreement also 
stems from the potential for commingling of organizational and personal data on a 
personally owned device. To set a user’s expectation of privacy appropriately, EEOC 
includes an “Expectation of Privacy” notice within its user agreement.198 This notice 
informs the user, “EEOC will respect the privacy of your personal device and will only 
request access to the device by technicians to implement security controls… or to 
respond to legitimate discovery requests arriving out of administrative, civil, or criminal 
proceedings.”199 Although the notice only applies to users who download corporate data 
to their personal device via GroupWise, it helps to reinforce the aforementioned 
organizational policy against downloading organizational data to a personal device.200 
While the EEOC respects the users’ privacy, this notice informs them that if they choose 
                                                 








not to adhere to policy, the EEOC, under certain circumstances, can rightfully gain access 
to the personal device to ensure the protection of corporate data. 
Since the BYOD program is voluntary, if users at any time decide they do not 
want to comply with the requirements outlined in the user agreement or find the 
requirements too burdensome, they may opt out of the BYOD program.201 In such 
instances, the EEOC will suspend the employees’ ability to synchronize to enterprise 
resources and conduct a selective wipe of the organizational container.202 The selective 
wipe by design only erases data residing in the container and does not affect any personal 
data outside of the container. This process ensures that organizational data is protected 
and preserves the users’ privacy on the personal side of the device. The above-mentioned 
BYOD policy controls implemented by the EEOC help to protect the organization from 
potential user privacy concerns and illustrate how reliant the organization is on strict 
participant adherence to user policy to mitigate these concerns. 
3. Consumer Packaged Goods Firm 
The CPG is similar to the EEOC in that it too employs a MDM solution that 
allows it to manage and enforce its security policies easily on registered devices. 
Additionally, the CPG’s BYOD program, like the EEOC’s program, provides employees 
the ability to synchronize to corporate email, calendars, contacts, and notes on their 
personally owned device.203 The CPG, however, has not implemented a container 
solution, and as a result, many of the user privacy concerns that exist for EEOC 
employees accessing enterprise services through GroupWise also exist for employees 
accessing the CPG’s corporate data. As no technical controls are in place to separate 
organizational data from the personal side of the device, the potential exists for the 
commingling of organizational and personal data on an employee’s personally owned 
device. To address this issue, the CPG, like the EEOC, relies on strict participant 
adherence to user policy to mitigate potential organizational and user privacy concerns. 
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To ensure that BYOD participants are aware of potential constraints that may 
exist when using their mobile device as dual use, the CPG requires employees to read, 
acknowledge, and adhere to the user agreement prior to enrolling. The user agreement 
outlines the company’s policy and defines what is perceived as acceptable use when 
storing and processing company data on a personally owned device.204 Moreover, the 
user agreement serves as a voluntary contract between the employee and the 
organization, which permits the CPG to restrict or revoke access if the policy is 
violated.205 In addition to defining acceptable use, the CPG provides supplemental 
controls and notifications within its BYOD policy that attempt to address user privacy 
concerns. 
One such supplementary control addressing a user privacy concern is highlighted 
in the “Intellectual Property Restrictions” section of the company policy.206 This section 
informs the user, “All material that passes through the Company network or that is stored 
on Mobile Devices—including personally owned Mobile Devices—for the purpose of 
conducting business belongs to the Company.”207 Additionally, it states, “This material is 
subject to the Company ownership, confidentiality and use restrictions that apply.”208 
Although this control does not stipulate that the company will arbitrarily access the 
personal side of the device, it serves as a reminder to the user that organizational data 
belongs to the company, and if needed, the CPG can and will access the device to ensure 
that its data is protected. This control is also highlighted in the “Privacy” section of the 
CPG’s “Appropriate Use of Electronic Media Policy,” which supports the overall 
company policy of acceptable use by again stressing that any organizational data stored 
on personal devices is the property of the CPG.209 Although legal aspects are associated 
with accessing an employee’s personal device without the employee’s knowledge or 
consent, they fall outside the scope of this research. Still, the CPG has taken steps 
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through policy to minimize the need to access an employee’s personal device by clearly 
identifying what constitutes acceptable use and defining it in the user agreement. 
Several additional user policy issues that the CPG has worked to overcome also 
stem from employee privacy concerns. In the case of data discovery, the CPG user policy 
identifies the possibility of a legal hold on the mobile device to conduct the data 
discovery.210 Some employees have interpreted this legal hold to mean that the company 
will take custody of the dual use device for an indefinite period of time. In actuality, the 
CPG will seize the device just long enough to make a copy of the data it contains before 
returning it to the owner.211 Several CPG employees have also expressed skepticism 
regarding remote wipes.212 The CPG user policy stipulates that employees must let the 
company know immediately if their device is lost or stolen, at which point the CPG can 
leverage MobileIron to wipe the device remotely.213 In this case, confusion can arise 
regarding what constitutes “immediately,” especially if the owners does not know if they 
dropped it at the airport or simply left it at a friend’s house. Since the CPG has not 
implemented technological solutions to create separate work and personal instantiations, 
it cannot prevent the possible commingling of organization and personal data. This being 
the case, the entire device must be wiped if lost or stolen. The last stipulation that has 
required clarification is that the user must leave location services turned on.214 The CPG 
clearly states within its user policy that this will only be used to find a lost device; 
however, employees have voiced concerns that the company might use it to track their 
activities.215 The potential to track a user’s location is a significant concern to sales 
personnel and others with roles involving travel.216 
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As both the EEOC’s web-based access to GroupWise and the CPG have no 
technological solution in place to provide for the separation between organizational and 
personal use of the device, their policies state that should a remote wipe be required, the 
organization will seek to only delete organizational email or company data, 
respectively.217 Although not specifically stated in either the EEOC’s or the CPG’s 
policy, because the possibility exists that organizational data can be commingled with 
personal data, the entire device may need to be wiped. Additionally, both policies state 
that in the event of a legal hold, the organization may need to access all data stored on the 
personally owned device.218 In the case of the EEOC, this practice is only applicable if a 
BYOD user does not adhere to policy, such as downloading government email, 
attachments, or documents to the personal device.219 The CPG policy clearly states that 
privacy cannot be assured, and although it is not explicitly stated in the EEOC’s policy, 
the same can be reasonably inferred.220 
The three highlighted case studies demonstrate that user privacy is a major 
concern when implementing a BYOD program. Additionally, they illustrate how 
organizations can and have overcome potential privacy concerns that arise when allowing 
a personally owned device access to organizational data. While many of these concerns 
can be mitigated through technological solutions, a well-developed policy outlining 
additional compensating security controls can also ensure that these concerns are 
alleviated. 
C. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
Recognizing that user privacy plays a significant role in any BYOD program, the 
USMC identified privacy as one of the factors that led it to implementing a technological 
solution utilizing containerization. The container solution under evaluation by the USMC 
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creates a separate secure organizational instantiation on a personally owned device and 
aligns with the type of solution recommended in NIST SP 800-124, which states, “The 
client application and data should be sandboxed from the rest of the device’s applications 
and data in a secure container, both helping to protect the enterprise from a compromised 
device and helping to preserve the privacy of the device’s owner.”221 The separation that 
a container solution provides enhances privacy as compared to previously discussed 
EEOC and CPG BYOD technological solutions, so that the USMC BYOD user privacy 
concerns can be more easily addressed and minimized. 
The USMC also relies on policy, user agreements, and training to inform 
participants that when utilizing the organizational or enterprise side of the device, traffic 
is forced through the USMC-VPN, which allows for inspection and monitoring as if 
working from a government system. Monitoring user activity on a government system or 
network is a practice, with which government employees and contractors are well 
accustomed and widely accept. Conversely, the personal instantiation utilizes commercial 
Internet or cellular service to send and receive traffic. Therefore, the personal traffic is 
not monitored or even seen by the organization, which in essence, preserves a user’s 
privacy. 
A key concern when implementing a BYOD program is the development of sound 
policy. By leveraging known security controls and lessons learned from the 
aforementioned case studies and applicable publications, the USMC can more effectively 
develop a policy that strikes the right balance between security, privacy, and 
convenience. As a result, Chapter IV discusses the policy development methodology, as 
well as considerations and recommendations as they relate to the development of USMC 
BYOD policy. 
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IV. BYOD POLICY DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY AND 
CONSIDERATIONS 
To provide a more detailed analysis of the established security controls associated 
with the case study subjects, an effort was made to identify every security control from 
the three case study user policies with possible applicability to the USMC BYOD 
program. These applicable case study controls were then utilized as a starting point to 
develop a viable BYOD user agreement for the USMC.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
With regard to information assurance (IA), an adversary’s primary goals can be 
grouped into three general categories: “unauthorized access, unauthorized modification, 
and denial of authorized access.”222 Adversaries attempt to leverage any number of 
vulnerabilities to accomplish these goals. The intent of an information security policy is 
to establish an organizational target for what it means for its systems and data to be 
secure, which in turn, leads to a set of countermeasures or controls, which when adhered 
to, reduce risk to a level acceptable to the organization.  
The purpose of developing this proposed BYOD user agreement is twofold, 1) to 
mitigate some of the inherent risks associated with implementing a BYOD program on 
unclassified MCEN, and 2) to communicate risk to the end users with respect to their 
property and data. As outlined in FIPS Publication 199, the three security objectives for 
information and information systems are confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA).223 To this end, a baseline of security controls (and associated security 
enhancements) applicable to BYOD have been identified from the NIST Special 
Publication 800-53 Revision 4 (SP-800-53), Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
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Information Systems and Organizations.224 These baseline controls were then compared 
and mapped to the corresponding standards listed within the user agreements collected 
from the TTB, the EEOC and the CPG. The compiled list of controls from the previous 
two steps was then narrowed to a set of policy standards relevant to the USMC’s BYOD 
program. Finally, these controls were also compared to applicable DOD and USMC 
policies to create the proposed BYOD user agreement (Appendix B) to support the 
technological solutions being evaluated by the USMC. Factors considered for policy 
development, as well as the methodology, are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  BYOD Policy Analysis and Development Methodology 
1. Methodology Definitions 
This section describes and defines facets of the policy development and control 
selection methodology depicted in Figure 1. 
As discussed in the first section of Chapter II, security requirements are applied to 
an information system to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
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information being processed, stored, or transmitted.225 The USMC BYOD security 
requirements are secure remote authentication, maintaining device OS integrity, and the 
protection and control of the organizational network and data. 
The concept of security capability is a construct that recognizes that the protection 
of information being processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems, seldom 
derives from a single safeguard or countermeasure (i.e., security control).226 NIST SP-
800-53 defines a security capability as “a combination of mutually reinforcing security 
controls (i.e., safeguards/countermeasures) implemented by technical means (i.e., 
functionality in hardware, software, and firmware), physical means (i.e., physical devices 
and protective measures), and/or procedural means (i.e., procedures performed by 
individuals).”227 In most cases, such protection results from the selection and 
implementation of a set of mutually reinforcing controls.228 Thus, an organization can 
consider defining a set of security capabilities as a precursor to the security control 
selection process.229 In taking this approach, a set of security capability requirements 
were identified based on the USMC provided security requirements, followed by 
identifying the necessary security controls to accomplish these requirements. For the 
USMC’s BYOD program, the security capability requirements follow the principles of 
the CIA triad and align with and address the primary security requirements as delineated 
by the USMC. The U.S. Marine Corps Chief of the Vision and Strategy Division stated, 
“the organizational container has two pieces that must be protected: the VPN connector 
and the derived PKI credentials. The security of the encrypted data containers is also a 
major concern as we must ensure that if lost or compromised, the data container remains 
intact and the intruder cannot use the device to access the network.”230 
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Appendix A lists the controls set forth in the case study user agreements (TTB’s, 
EEOC’s and CPG’s). Each case study policy control has been mapped to the 
corresponding security control(s) and associated enhancement(s) listed in the NIST SP-
800-53. Additionally, the three primary security requirements provided by the USMC are 
matched to each control as are the IA concerns that each policy control is designed to 
address. Many of the SP-800-53 security controls overlap and complement each other, 
which creates a security capability. Thus, the overlap of security controls is evident in 
Appendix A, as multiple SP-800-53 derived security controls often apply to any one 
organizational policy standard. Although not listed in Appendix A, NIST SP-800-124, 
“Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise,” and GAO-
12-757, “Better Implementation of Controls for Mobile Devices Should Be Encouraged,” 
echo many of the same security control considerations.231 SP-800-124 and GAO-12-757 
controls are not listed in Appendix A because the SP-800-53 is the governing security 
controls document identified for this research. Listing the associated controls from the 
SP-800-124 and GAO-12-757 would therefore be redundant. However, it is important to 
be aware of the amplifying information and guidance contained within these two 
publications for reference in the endeavor to develop a viable BYOD user agreement. 
B. DEVELOPMENT 
The review of numerous development recommendations, as well as existing DOD 
and DON user agreements, identified broad disparities, in both user agreement format 
and content. However, to best serve the Marine Corps’ BYOD program, the following six 
sections have been recognized as common or essential components, with background 
being optional: purpose or overview, objectives, background, scope, standards, and 
compliance. The purpose describes why the policy is being implemented. It defines the 
challenge that the policy is addressing and ensures that everyone affected by the policy 
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understands its content and applicability.232 To establish a common understanding, it 
may also be necessary to define terms.233 Objectives describe the expected outcome as a 
result of policy enforcement.234 The researchers have chosen to combine the purpose and 
objectives sections to create a more coherent BYOD policy. Although not required, a 
background section is also beneficial to add historical context to a policy and to amplify 
the intent. A policy scope identifies those who might be affected by a policy or to whom 
the policy applies.235 Standards provide organizational-level directives regarding 
acceptable methods or user behaviors.236 For instance, these rules within a BYOD 
program might consist of how organizational data can be accessed or how organizational 
email can be used. The last section of a policy is compliance, which clearly states the 
possible consequences of not adhering to the standards and guidelines as listed in the user 
agreement.237 
Careful considerations regarding the length of this proposed user agreement were 
also considered. Problems with user agreement length are twofold. First, if the document 
is too short, various guidelines or controls will either be addressed vaguely and 
ambiguously, or not addressed at all. Second, an overly long user agreement creates a 
situation in which employees may not read it, or they may read it and not retain the 
content. The TTB, the EEOC, and the CPG’s BYOD user agreements range from three to 
six pages in length, which became our target range to provide clear and retainable 
information to BYOD users. 
Finding the correct policy balance can also reduce some legal issues associated 
with BYOD by protecting both the organization and the employees. Early BYOD user 
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agreements were simple and vague.238 These early agreements did not provide clear rules 
for behavior and “consisted of generalizations about what organizations and employees 
can and cannot do.”239 As a result, these BYOD agreements were, for the most part, 
inadequate when referenced for discovery or when employees voiced privacy 
concerns.240 Lawyers subsequently became involved to help companies draft detailed 
agreements encompassing numerous scenarios to include legal cases for e-discovery.241 
BYOD agreements grew in length and “favored the company’s right to monitor, access, 
review, and disclose company or other data on BYOD mobile phones and tablets.”242 
Additionally, early agreements provided little consideration to an employee’s expectation 
of privacy, which raised concerns that organizations were violating the National Labor 
Relations Act by placing too much control over an employee’s use of the Internet, 
BYOD, and social media.243 Many of these concerns are allayed based on the USMC 
technological solution, which creates separate personal and organizational instances, but 
must still be considered for policy application. 
1. Development of Security Control Categories 
To simplify the presentation of the proposed user agreement and create a coherent 
format that BYOD participants can easily read and logically follow, the applicable 
standards were parsed into four categories: personnel (administrative), technical, 
operational, and physical. These categories were determined after studying how various 
controls are described and categorized in applicable DOD guidance, the NIST SP-800-53, 
the Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF), as well as the BYOD policy 
and legal considerations put forth by Littler Mendelson, P.C. 
                                                 








The NIST SP-800-53 security control catalog consists of 18 control families with 
numerous controls and enhancements listed within each family of controls.244 The 18 
control families are too specific for user agreement application. However, the SP-800-53 
lists three categories in which these 18 control families can fall: management, 
operational, and technical.245 Although a great starting point, identifying management as 
a category for policy has the possible connotation of “only applying to management.” 
Also listed in the SP-800-53 are the three ways in which a security control can be 
implemented via technical, physical, and procedural means.246 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 
puts forth a myriad of excellent policy considerations for the implementation of a BYOD 
program, but narrowly assigns the categories of technical controls and operating 
procedures.247 DOD Directive (DODD) 8500.01E establishes policy and assigns 
responsibilities to achieve DOD IA through the integration of personnel, operations, and 
technology.248 The breakdown of personnel, operations, and technology listed in DOD 
Directive 8500.01E provides a manageable set of categories under which each BYOD 
policy standard can apply. The IATF identifies the same factors as DOD Directive 
8500.01E in support of IA. The IATF states, “information assurance relies on the people, 
the operations, and the technology to accomplish the mission/business and to manage the 
technology/information infrastructure.”249 The categories of operations and technical 
were common among most of the aforementioned sources. However, it was determined 
that the control categories of personnel, operations, and technology, as listed in both the 
DODD 8500.01E and IATF, was the better approach because these categories best 
capture the required facets of most any IA or IT related policy. 
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To this list of personnel, operations and technology, the category of physical 
controls (as identified in the SP-800-53) was added. Physical security or protection of a 
mobile device is of significant importance and worthy of a separate category because it is 
precisely the mobility and small form factor of these platforms that separates them from a 
traditionally stationary IT resource.250 In the past, and because it is not portable, an 
organization did not have to worry about employees losing their desktop computer at the 
airport. Furthermore, because the computer stayed in a secured office or building, the 
possibility of an employee’s desktop computer being stolen was also not a significant 
concern. The mobility and small size of the devices utilized within a BYOD program 
require additional physical protection, which will be incumbent upon the employee to 
perform. 
As addressing privacy concerns is a major portion of this research, a separate 
section regarding privacy was also added. Moreover, the researchers felt it important to 
separate the issue of privacy because as described in the case of the CPG, numerous 
employees expressed concerns regarding privacy associated with organizational legal 
holds to support data discovery, as well as location services. Therefore, it is best to 
address privacy within its own section because employees who choose to participate in 
the Marine Corps’ BYOD program are likely to have similar concerns. 
In some cases, the aforementioned references clearly place individual security 
controls within a specific control category (e.g., personnel, operations, technical). In such 
cases, security controls are categorized accordingly. However, often these references do 
not clearly categorize many of the security controls. In those cases in which no clear 
indication of a control’s classification exists, security controls were categorized based on 
where such controls best fit within the proposed user agreement or how the control will 
be implemented (e.g., technical, physical, or procedural). 
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2. Analysis and Recommended Controls to Support USMC Security 
Requirements 
To satisfy the USMC security requirements, research efforts were able to narrow 
the list of pertinent controls because many overarching security capabilities should 
already be established within components of the MCEN, which is the infrastructure 
through which organizational data will be accessed and organizational BYOD traffic will 
traverse. As an example, role-based access control policies that describe which users can 
access which files are already established within the MCEN. The USMC BYOD program 
inherits these controls, and thus, it is not necessary to address them explicitly in BYOD 
policy. As previously discussed, Appendix A provides amplifying details regarding the 
case study user agreement controls and how they correlate to the USMC’s primary 
security requirements. 
Based on the primary security concerns and the technological solutions being 
considered, the next section describes the controls necessary to support the USMC’s 
BYOD program and why certain controls have been selected. Many of the policy controls 
identified in Appendix A are similar to those identified within the draft Marine Corps 
Portable Electronic Device user agreement and associated policies; however, several 
differences have been identified and are worthy of further discussion.251 The USMC is 
adopting a robust set of technological solutions to address its primary BYOD security 
requirements. However, the application of acceptable use controls to compliment these 
technological solutions will help to further address and mitigate these security concerns. 
C. PRIMARY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
The three primary security requirements, as identified by the USMC, and how the 
USMC’s technological approach supports these requirements are the topic of this section. 
User agreement and additional technical control recommendations are also discussed to 
support these security requirements. 
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1. Controls to Support Secure Remote Authentication 
The technological solutions being evaluated by the USMC provide a sound 
process for secure remote authentication and adhere to the guiding principles listed in the 
SP-800-53. Since the derived credentials are resident on the personally owned device, the 
USMC considers the device itself as “something you have.”252 Therefore, the derived 
PKI credentials resident within the organizational container coupled with a required PIN 
(“something you know”) establishes two-factor authentication while the VPN protects 
data-in-transit. Moreover, the USMC requires a PIN (or similar access mechanism 
depending on device type) to access the phone initially, followed by a username and 
password to access the organizational container. This being the case, the protection of 
access credentials becomes one of the primary user controls and is easy to address within 
the user agreement. 
Since logical access to the organizational container uses single-factor 
authentication, passwords must comply with the complexity and maintenance 
requirements as outlined in Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) security 
technical implementation guide (STIG) for application security and development.253 This 
STIG provides guidance regarding password complexity, reuse, length, and periodic 
change requirements to name a few.254 Adherence to this password guidance for 
accessing the organizational container protects organizational data resident on the device 
and supports secure remote authentication. If participants cannot access the container, 
they cannot access the VPN connector and derived credentials necessary to establish a 
remote connection to the MCEN. 
Additional controls associated with maintaining the device OS integrity and 
configuration settings, as well as the encryption of the organizational container, provide 
layers of defense in depth to support the secure remote authentication requirement. The 
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process to register and activate a device in the USMC BYOD program ensures approved 
device accountability while also establishing proper configuration settings. An iOS user, 
for example, downloads the AT&T Toggle application from the Apple store.255 The 
USMC provides an enterprise activation code to the user and also sends an email with 
guidance to configure the personally owned device properly.256 The settings specified in 
the STIG are then remotely applied to the organizational container application.257 This 
basic process is the same for all device types. Technological solutions are in place to 
identify the device and to ensure the device falls within acceptable parameters prior to 
being allowed access to the MCEN.258 Based on the USMC technological solution 
already in place, secure remote authentication is quite possibly the easiest security 
requirement to address within the user agreement. 
User agreement controls identified from the case study organizations can be 
incorporated into the USMC BYOD policy to augment secure remote authentication. For 
example, a BYOD participant must log off and disconnect from the VPN when done 
working. Technological solutions should also be in place to enforce this requirement, 
such as an automatic disconnect following five minutes of inactivity. The same control 
should be in place for the organizational container. This control has the added benefit of 
protecting organizational data and networks should a user forget to log out of the 
organizational container or disconnect from the VPN providing unfettered access if a 
device is subsequently lost or stolen. 
Following a set number of failed attempts to enter the correct PIN, a technological 
solution should be in place to block VPN access from a personally owned device. 
Optimally, the failed VPN access attempts should also automatically log out of and lock 
the organizational container until the participant is able to contact the USMC helpdesk to 
unlock the container and restore the capability to establish VPN connections. As an added 
measure of defense-in-depth, a remote wipe of the organizational container could also be 
                                                 





initiated. The same controls should also be put in place to protect the organizational 
container from unauthorized access. 
Split tunneling is not a significant concern as a result of the separation provided 
by the Marine Corps’ BYOD technological solution. Split tunneling means that a remote 
or VPN client may maintain a VPN tunnel with the MCEN while also directly 
communicating with non-MCEN systems. While working inside the organizational 
container, all Internet traffic traverses the MCEN VPN. However, possible vulnerabilities 
exist within the USMC BYOD solution regarding a non-traditional “split-tunnel” via the 
physical connection of a personally owned mobile device to a non-organizational system. 
Synchronizing and backing up data stored on personally owned mobile devices 
require clear policy guidance. Directly connecting personally owned mobile devices to 
government IT resources is not allowed, but additional considerations must also be 
addressed within acceptable use policies. For instance, the BYOD participant must 
terminate an active VPN connection and log out of the organizational container prior to 
directly connecting a personally owned device to a personal computer, storage, or any 
other external device. The most favorable approach would be to incorporate a 
technological capability in which the mobile OS detects the direct connection and 
automatically terminates the VPN connection and prohibits access to the organizational 
container throughout the duration of the direct connection. This control will mitigate a 
myriad of possibilities associated with a non-organizational computer establishing a 
connection to the MCEN, the introduction of malware onto the network, and prevents the 
backup of organizational data to a non-organizational information system. 
Furthermore, backing up organizational data to cloud-based storage services, such 
as iCloud and Dropbox, should be explicitly prohibited. Technical solutions, such as the 
blacklisting of cloud-based storage websites, should also be in place to enforce this 
policy. Additionally, the agreement should state that BYOD participants will not attempt 
to circumvent the separation between the personal and organizational side of the dual use 
device to include emailing government information from an official email account to a 
personal email account, such as Gmail or Hotmail. 
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The agreement should state that the USMC is not responsible for lost or stolen 
personally owned devices or lost personal data stored on the device. Backups of personal 
data resident on the personal side of the dual use device are the responsibility of the 
participant and should be routinely performed. 
2. Controls to Support Device OS Integrity 
Maintaining OS integrity on a personally owned device is possibly the most 
important security requirement for the USMC BYOD program as the ramifications of a 
compromised OS effect both secure remote authentication and the protection and control 
of organizational networks and data. Specific guidance and associated disciplinary 
actions regarding attempts to root or jailbreak a personally owned mobile device should 
be clearly stated, especially since the USMC is leaning towards the sandbox approach. 
Rooting or jailbreaking a mobile device compromises OS integrity, which also 
compromises the separation between the personal and work instantiations resident on the 
device. Ultimately, the VPN connector, derived PKI credentials and data resident within 
the organizational container would no longer be secure, which could also create a worst 
case security scenario, which is unauthorized access to the MCEN. 
The USMC security practice of automatically encrypting the organizational 
container through the utilization of AES 256-bit encryption in addition to the access 
controls in place makes unauthorized access to organizational data and the MCEN 
unlikely.259 The USMC is confident that if individuals attempt to exploit the 
organizational container, for example via a random access memory (RAM) dump, they 
still cannot glean much (if any) meaningful data from inside the container as a result of 
the encryption.260 However, a rooted or jailbroken device can introduce malware capable 
of capturing keystrokes and screen shots, which can then be used to conduct a myriad of 
additional exploits.261 According to McAfee, 2.4 million samples of new mobile malware 
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emerged in 2013.262 The presence of malware on a personally owned device increases the 
likelihood of unauthorized disclosure and can also establish root access. It is, therefore, 
imperative that participants adhere to user agreement controls that also require 
maintaining and applying available updates to the original mobile OS, as well as prohibit 
the downloading of unauthorized third-party applications. 
The relevant controls listed in the case study user agreements can be leveraged to 
address this security requirement. For example, the user will not install unauthorized 
software or make any attempt to jailbreak the personally owned device. Conversely, only 
applications from organization-approved application stores (i.e., the DISA Mobile App 
Store) may be downloaded and utilized within the organizational container. A 
whitelisting approach to MAM is recommended within the organizational container 
because it would be easier to track and manage permitted applications in this 
environment. Whereas a blacklisting approach on the personal side of the device is 
recommended to protect against known threats to mobile platforms that may also pose a 
threat to the integrity of the organizational container. Taking a whitelisting approach on 
the personal side of the device will prove difficult to manage and will also place too 
much of a constraint on a BYOD participant’s personal use.  
The ability to detect a compromised mobile OS or unauthorized software also 
ensures BYOD participants can use the personal side of the device as they choose. 
Careful and routine use of a personally owned device—such as basic web browsing or 
opening an email attachment from a trusted source—can still result in the inadvertent 
download of malware. Therefore, having this technological solution in place to support 
user behavior is vital to allowing participants the freedom to access organizational 
resources when and where they need it, while not limiting the personal use of a device to 
the point in which participating in a BYOD program is not beneficial. However, 
participants must be aware that certain activities conducted on the personal side of the 
device can have adverse impacts on the organizational side. 
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The USMC technological solutions under evaluation have the capability to detect 
when a device OS has been altered; however, this detection capability is not completely 
effective.263 If it is an acceptable risk to the USMC, then the technological solution to 
detect the rooting or jailbreaking of a device coupled with BYOD user adherence to the 
agreement is required to counter this risk to the greatest extent possible. 
The containerization approach certainly adds a layer of defense through access 
control and encryption for data-at-rest; yet, technical solutions can do very little to 
counter social engineering and phishing attempts. Therefore, initial and annual training 
requirements must be in place as attackers will also seek to exploit personally owned 
mobile devices and the organizational data they contain through what is arguably the 
weakest security link, the device user. 
Device OS integrity is also supported through additional user agreement controls 
identified from the NIST SP-800-53 and the case study organizations. Although such 
technological solutions check for device configuration settings, the user agreement 
should also stipulate that participants will not alter these settings. Furthermore, personally 
owned devices should be inspected by the organization following foreign travel to ensure 
proper configuration and to ensure no signs of physical tampering prior to resuming its 
use to access organizational networks and data. Certain configuration changes may also 
need to be considered prior to foreign travel, especially to those countries or areas 
deemed as high risk. This research recommends disallowing the use of personally owned 
devices to access enterprise resources while outside of U.S. territories and Canada. 
Instead, a small stock of government furnished devices can be configured and checked 
out before conducting official travel to moderate or high-risk countries. Recommended 
practices for unofficial travel are discussed in Section E, Subsection 6 regarding 
overtime. 
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3. Controls to Support the Protection and Control of Organizational 
Data 
Technical solutions are in place to protect organizational data. The USMC 
organizational container (and all content) is encrypted utilizing AES 256-bit encryption. 
This protection of data-at-rest is important because as discussed, the VPN connector and 
derived PKI credentials could be utilized to gain unauthorized access to the MCEN. 
Furthermore, participants have the latitude to save sensitive (not classified) information 
within the organizational container. In addition to the credentials required to access the 
organizational container, and the network access controls (NAC) in place to detect a 
compromised device, additional layers of defense-in-depth are provided through 
encryption and the ability to remote wipe the organizational container. 
It is important for the agreement to clarify the fact that all information stored, 
processed, or transmitted within the organizational container belongs to the USMC. The 
user agreement should stipulate that saving organizational data to cloud-based storage 
services is strictly prohibited, as these services cannot guarantee confidentiality, and may 
result in a situation in which data resides outside of organizational control. Blacklisting 
websites associated with such services will support this control. However, blacklisting 
these sites could stifle some coordination efforts with organizations outside of the 
USMC. Additionally, only authorized individuals are allowed to post organizational 
content online. This control addresses multiple concerns associated with operational 
security and mitigates the possible posting of sensitive information not approved for 
release. Attempts to circumvent or bypass these controls should also be prohibited to 
include emailing organizational data from an official email address to a personal email 
account. 
To ensure the protection and control of organizational data further, guidance is 
required to handle the separation or transfer of employees. A process should be 
developed to ensure managers or human resource departments notify BYOD 
administrators of such personnel issues so that the organizational container can be wiped 
from the associated personally owned device. The user agreement should also clarify that 
a remote wipe of the organizational container will be initiated upon notification of a 
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participant’s separation from the organization. Assuming an employee leaves the 
organization under favorable circumstances, the requirement to checkout with the IT 
department and BYOD administrators can be incorporated into the checkout process. 
This process can also be used to ensure accountability of BYOD participants and to 
support the transfer of military personnel to new duty stations. 
Additional issues need to be considered with the transfer of military personnel. 
For example, it may be advisable to terminate or suspend VPN access to the MCEN at 
checkout, and subsequently, reactivate or reenroll the service member during check-in at 
the next duty station. Suspension and transfer of BYOD access would allow the 
participant to utilize the same credentials at the service member’s next command 
following the successful completion of BYOD enrollment. Whereas termination may 
require wiping the organizational container at checkout and starting the process from 
scratch during check-in at the new duty station. The termination and wipe option would 
ensure that the new command has positive oversight of the BYOD participant. 
Furthermore, this practice ensures that organizational data resident on the personally 
owned device cannot be unnecessarily accessed or disseminated by the service member 
as information pertinent to the member’s prior position may not be pertinent to the new 
position. The termination and wipe option is recommended because it can be easily 
administered and applied as a blanket process for transfer, separation, termination, and 
retirement scenarios. Alternatively, the suspension method is similar to the process for 
transferring individuals and security clearances in conjunction with a permanent change 
of duty station, which will require increased administrative overhead and coordination. 
Additionally, the suspension option could result in a security lapse between the gaining 
and losing units. 
In reality, this process should probably be handled on a case-by-case basis with 
the service member responsible to communicate to the BYOD administrators in the event 
data resident within the organizational container is required for a follow-on assignment. 
If the service member does not communicate the requirement to retain organizational data 
to BYOD administrators, the protocol for addressing the transfer of a military member 
will default to one of the aforementioned terminate or suspend procedures. 
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D. PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A common misconception associated with a BYOD program is that participation 
requires employees to relinquish all expectations of privacy on a personally owned 
device.264 This misconception, however, is only partially correct because while 
employees are entitled to an expectation of privacy when using a personally owned 
device for dual use, the expectation is potentially lower than if they were not in the 
program. Even though an employee in a BYOD program may incur a lower expectation 
of privacy, it is nevertheless important for an organization to recognize that an employee 
does have certain inherent rights codified by statute, unless those rights are explicitly 
waived.265 For example, both the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and 
Stored Communications Act (SCA) make unauthorized access to a computer —in this 
case, a personal mobile device—and stored emails on a personal mobile device a criminal 
offense.266 Additionally, when the organization is the U.S. government, the Fourth 
Amendment also applies, affirming “The right of the people…against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”267 
A key concern of the USMC in implementing its BYOD program is ensuring that 
a participant’s expectation of privacy is protected on the personal side of the device. To 
alleviate these concerns, The Littler Report recommends using a sandbox or virtual 
container approach to separate the personal side of the device from the organization 
side.268 The USMC is implementing this containerized approach via its technological 
solution, which allows the management and protection of organizational data without 
needing to access personal information residing outside the organizational container. 
While this solution alleviates many of the USMC and participant privacy concerns, case 
study research revealed additional concerns common to participants that could arise when 
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implementing a BYOD program. As such, in conjunction with the technological solution, 
it is essential that the USMC also address these concerns through policy and a carefully 
crafted user agreement to ensure that a user’s expectation of privacy is preserved as much 
as possible and the terms of participation are clearly defined. 
1. Monitoring 
A stipulation in the draft USMC BYOD user agreement, which is also integrated 
into Appendix B, states that employees are subject to monitoring when using a personally 
owned device to access the organizational container.269 The capability to monitor user 
activity on a government system or network is a common practice within the DOD and 
supports the DOD’s responsibility of conducting Computer Network Defense (CND). 
DODI O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense, states that CND is “Actions 
taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within 
DOD information systems and computer networks.”270 Thus, to align with broader DOD 
policy, the USMC is required to monitor their systems and networks. By signing a user 
agreement, employees provide their consent to monitoring; however, the USMC, through 
its technical solution, ensures monitoring is only conducted on the organizational 
container.  
To ensure that employees are cognizant of when activities will be monitored, it is 
recommended that the USMC implement a notification banner. As outlined in control 
AC-8 of SP-800-53, a notification banner should be displayed when accessing the 
organizational container.271 Additionally, this banner should inform BYOD participants 
of “relevant privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws, Executive 
Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.”272 As an example, the 
banner should state:  
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“1.  Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system;  
2.  Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject 
to audit;  
3.  Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and 
subject to criminal and civil penalties; and  
4.  Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and 
recording; 
5. This banner should remain visible to the user until he 
acknowledges the usage conditions.”273 
2. Legal Holds and Data Discovery 
A privacy concern that exists in any BYOD program involves the organization’s 
ability to access personal information residing on a dual use device through the process of 
a legal hold and data discovery. This issue is a point of contention for many employees 
who feel that the process is too intrusive and reduces their expectation of privacy. 
Regardless of opinion, legal holds when conducted in accordance with organizational 
regulations and policy are warranted under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FCRP), which state, “a party must produce responsive documents and 
electronically stored information (ESI) that are in its possession, custody or control.”274 
Therefore, it is essential that organizations draft policy and user agreements that clearly 
define the terms and conditions that constitute a legal hold and data discovery. 
Additionally, organizations should inform employees of the risks associated with a legal 
hold and data discovery, such as limited access to personal data and the potential loss of 
that data. 
The technological solution currently under evaluation by the USMC helps 
mitigate many of the privacy concerns for both the employee and the organization that 
could arise from a legal hold or data discovery. The containerized approach allows for the 
management and protection of organizational data without needing to access personal 
information residing outside the organizational container. As a result, anything outside 
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the organizational container belongs to the employee, and consequently, is not remotely 
accessible to the government without a court order.275 For the USMC, this approach 
preserves the employee’s expectation of privacy outside the organizational container. 
Additionally, it holds an employee responsible for any legal matters that could stem from 
using their personal side of the device unlawfully. In such cases, legal holds for data 
discovery would be handled outside of the USMC channels and require the applicable 
authorities to issue a court order to the employee. To eliminate the need for a court order 
to conduct data discovery on the organizational container, the USMC is exploring ways 
to mirror data that resides in the container.276 Since the USMC cannot currently tunnel 
into the organizational container to validate content, mirroring would allow it to view 
data created by a user that resides on the organizational container and store it at remote 
locations under the control of the USMC.277 Although the USMC is currently working 
through the specifics, as owners of the organizational container, anything mirrored would 
be property of the USMC. As such, legal holds for data discovery on the organizational 
container would be eliminated because the data would already be mirrored and available 
to the USMC. 
3. Policy Compliance 
BYOD policy violations determined to be intentional or a repeat violation by the 
same individual should be documented in employee evaluations, as well as noted within 
the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) to ensure a record exists should the 
participant transfer and attempt the same or similar action in the future. This practice can 
also be utilized to determine BYOD participation sanctions and approvals, as well as 
identify potential insider threats. The legalities associated with this practice have not been 
researched, and as such, legal counsel should be obtained prior to implementing this 
control and the consequences of noncompliance. 
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E. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The policy considerations discussed in the following sections do not directly 
apply, in all cases, to one of the previously listed primary security requirements. For 
example, facets of BYOD program management are discussed. However, in many cases, 
it is easy to identify negative security consequences if a BYOD program is not properly 
managed. Additional ideas are pondered to invoke more thought regarding not only the 
potential risk to USMC networks and data when BYOD participants do not adhere to 
policy, but also potential vulnerabilities within a BYOD program that an adversary might 
seek to exploit. 
1. Device Maintenance 
Based on the USMC technical support model, the enterprise helpdesk will provide 
maintenance support for the organizational container only (i.e., derived credentials, VPN 
connector, enterprise applications, configuration settings).278 BYOD participants will be 
responsible for any problem or malfunction outside the organizational container. In such 
instances, participants can take the personally owned device to their mobile carrier, 
manufacturer, or any number of private maintenance providers.  
External maintenance of a personally owned device could present a vulnerability 
or threat vector to the MCEN. Stuxnet displayed how malicious code can be introduced 
to cripple industrial control systems by forcing equipment to shut down or run outside 
operational parameters to cause engineering casualties.279 How much easier would it be 
for a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) to implant or recruit personnel working at these 
types of businesses to load malicious code or software on a personally owned mobile 
device under the auspices of routine maintenance? This scenario could create a 
significant threat vector for the MCEN, especially as the number of BYOD participants 
grows in fleet concentration areas. Although the technological solutions in place will help 
to detect such tampering or the installation of unauthorized software, it is not difficult to 
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imagine a scenario in which highly specialized malware could be introduced with the 
ability to bypass these technological controls. The practice of identifying approved 
maintenance providers with vetted technicians is not practical. Therefore, policy should 
state that BYOD participants must have their personally owned devices inspected for 
tampering following any maintenance performed by a third party. 
Policy should clarify that the USMC is not responsible for malfunctions, defects, 
or damage to a personally owned mobile device; therefore, the participant should not 
expect reimbursement for maintenance performed on the personal side of the device. 
2. Device Inventory 
The use of government furnished mobile devices within the MCEN is easier to 
administer and track, as device inventory is centrally managed and the organization 
controls the issuance of these devices. However, within a BYOD environment, 
employees have the option of purchasing new devices at any time based on personal 
preference. This situation will challenge an administrator’s ability to track and correlate a 
particular BYOD user to a specific device. Therefore, a control should be established to 
ensure participants first inform BYOD administrators so that appropriate actions, such as 
the removal of the organizational container, data, the VPN connector, and derived 
credentials can be accomplished prior to trading in the current device or transitioning the 
device to another member of the household, for example. The BYOD participant should 
subsequently register the new device by submitting an updated system access 
authorization request (SAAR), which will then allow for the installation of required 
software and credentials, as well as ensure the proper configuration of the new device. 
Without such a control, administrators will quickly lose track of personally owned mobile 
devices utilized within the BYOD program. Furthermore, with the VPN connector and 
derived credentials still present on the device, the possibility, however unlikely, exists for 
unauthorized access to the MCEN. Remote wiping of the organizational container will 
help mitigate this situation; however, if the employee trades in the mobile device just 
prior to a long weekend, a potential adversary will have several days to exploit the device 
prior to an administrator initiating the remote wipe. Encryption of the organizational 
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container minimizes this risk, but adherence to the aforementioned control requiring the 
participant to inform BYOD administrators first prior to trading or transferring ownership 
of a device will further alleviate this risk. 
The importance of maintaining an accurate inventory of personally owned devices 
used to access the MCEN is also highlighted in an Inspector General’s (IG) report 
regarding the U.S. Army’s management of commercial mobile devices (CMD). The IG 
report identifies numerous cybersecurity related vulnerabilities due to a lack of CMD 
accountability.280 These vulnerabilities stem from the fact that the Army CIO was 
unaware of more than 14,000 CMDs used throughout the Army.281 As these CMDs were 
not accurately tracked, the CMDs were not configured to protect stored information.282 A 
myriad of additional concerns were also identified to include no capability to wipe 
devices remotely, no ability to control CMDs used as removable media, no user training 
or signed user agreements, and no clear policy for CMDs purchased under pilot and non-
pilot programs.283 These shortfalls left Army networks more susceptible to attacks, as 
well as sensitive data leaks.284 
3. Approved Products List 
“The Marine Corps Commercial Mobile Device Strategy for BYOD relies heavily 
on separation technology within the end node terminal device to support multiple 
domains.”285 Therefore, only personally owned mobile devices with the capability to 
support multiple domains will be considered for inclusion on the authorized list of 
devices allowed to access the MCEN remotely.286 The USMC is working to establish a 
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BYOD program that will allow for the inclusion of most common device types. This 
program equates to a large quantity and variety of devices that will be allowed to operate 
within the MCEN. This being the case, it may be advisable to incorporate personally 
owned mobile devices in phases. This gradual approach will help ensure the smooth 
assimilation of mobile devices onto operational networks while easing the initial 
registration and administrative efforts. For example, the first two phases can work 
through the integration of devices utilizing Apple iOS and Android mobile operating 
systems, as these comprise the majority of personally owned devices within the U.S. 
market.287 Following the success of the first two phases, personally owned Blackberry 
and Microsoft devices (if Microsoft devices are approved) can then be added. 
User demand may also be a factor to consider. The EEOC only allows for the use 
of Android, iOS, and Blackberry devices within its BYOD program, primarily because 
EEOC employees have not communicated a demand for any additional or alternate 
device types.288 Furthermore, the EEOC only allows Apple iOS iPad devices to establish 
VPN connections to organizational data centers, which minimizes configuration 
management requirements. Organizations can establish a small internal approved 
products list (APL) based on DISA’s APL or allow any and all device types included in 
the DISA APL.289 Establishing a minimalistic APL eases the administrative overhead 
and helps scope enterprise service helpdesk support requirements, such as establishing or 
checking configuration settings on disparate devices. Whereas a broader APL creates 
better flexibility for the BYOD participant, and opens up a wide range of personally 
owned device selection options. Obvious pros and cons exist regarding both approaches, 
which must be considered to ensure the proper balance of user flexibility and associated 
risk with administrative overhead. The underlying BYOD technological solution will also 
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play a significant role in determining the right approach when identifying what devices 
will be allowed to participate. 
Limiting the number of personally owned mobile devices an individual can 
register and use within the BYOD program should also be considered. As an example, 
each participant could be limited to only one device authorized for remote access (i.e., 
one smartphone or one tablet). Limiting device types and number of devices allowed for 
each individual BYOD participant will reduce some of the challenges associated with 
forensic analysis and discovery, as well as remote wiping procedures. The number of 
devices that a command allows a participant to utilize should depend on the individual’s 
level of responsibility, as allowing one individual to utilize multiple personally owned 
devices to access the MCEN will increase the operating costs associated with paying for 
more client access licenses. 
4. Separation of Duties 
Compared to the organizations researched, the USMC’s BYOD program is unique 
in its technological approach, as well as the individuals it employs. Private sector and 
non-DOD government agencies consist of civilian or government civilian employees and 
contractors, whereas the USMC also employs active duty and reserve component 
Marines. BYOD policy criteria could limit participation only to full-time civilians, 
contractors, and Marines who will be assigned and continuously supporting a USMC 
command for six months or more. In the case of part-time employees or reserve 
component Marines involved in a typical one weekend per month and two weeks per year 
drill schedule, the basic ability to sync email, calendars, and contacts may be sufficient. 
Another possible scenario involves a government civilian or contractor who 
works for a Marine Corps command, and is also a reserve component Marine. This 
situation may become problematic and have legal implications if access to the MCEN 
based on roles and responsibilities are not clearly separated. A potential solution in this 
case may be the creation of two organizational containers on a personally owned device; 
however, it is unknown at this time whether the USMC BYOD technological solutions 
under evaluation can support this option. The current USMC solution to this situation is 
 79 
to issue two separate common access cards (CAC).290 Both accounts within Active 
Directory (AD) have their own user profiles and associated email addresses. The 
exchange server does have the capability to associate one user profile with two separate 
email addresses if in the same domain (i.e., usmc.mil).291 However, this issue also brings 
into question PKI credentials and how they are mapped to the user profiles. Separate 
from the technological solution used to address this problem, and whether the Marine 
Corps decides to limit BYOD participation to full or part-time employees, this issue—as 
it relates to BYOD—can be at least partially addressed through policy stating that an 
individual is not to access the MCEN for purposes outside the scope of assigned duties. 
This policy control will establish the general terms for remote access based on a user’s 
role, as well as create a foundation for disciplinary action should investigations reveal 
that an individual abused permissions not associated with an assigned responsibility. 
5. Labor Standards and Government Furloughs 
In general, active duty and reserve component Marines in an active status fall 
under the exempt status with respect to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). However, 
government agencies must be able to adjust and adapt to broader legislative issues, such 
as the furlough of government civilians because of sequestration. In the event of a 
furlough—such as those caused by a lapse of annual appropriations—non-essential 
government civilians are legally prohibited from conducting any government business 
even on a voluntary basis.292 
To provide a clarification of terms, a government civilian employee identified as 
exempt in block 35 of the Standard Form 50 (SF50) is not covered by the minimum wage 
and overtime laws present in the FLSA.293 “Generally, exempt employees, because of 
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their positional duties, responsibilities and level of decision making authority, are exempt 
from the overtime provisions of the FLSA, while nonexempt employees are eligible for 
overtime and are typically paid on an hourly basis.”294 However, the fact the employee is 
recognized as exempt does not broadly recognize an individual as mission essential, and 
consequently, allowed to work during a furlough. This situation creates an added 
challenge to ensure that both exempt and nonexempt government civilians are not 
conducting work for which pay is not authorized. 
Moreover, the Antideficiency Act does not allow for the authorization of any 
expenditure or obligation before an appropriation is made, unless authorized by law, thus 
solidifying the fact that unless identified as mission essential, government civilian 
employees cannot be paid for work conducted during a furlough.295 In this same vein, 
contractors are not allowed to charge hours against a contract for which appropriations 
have lapsed. 
To address these nonexempt and furlough issues, policy should be developed to 
clearly state when a device can (or cannot) be used for work-related activities. However, 
covering furlough scenario guidance will add unnecessary length and confusion to a 
BYOD policy and user agreement. Instead of attempting to clarify furlough-operating 
procedures within the standard BYOD user agreement, it is recommended that furlough 
guidance be developed separately from the BYOD user agreement or added to existing 
furlough policy to address this infrequent occurrence. 
During a furlough, government employees participating in a BYOD program will 
likely attempt to keep up with work requirements to avoid the inevitable mountain of 
backlog emails and tasks they will confront upon furlough termination. To ensure 
adherence to applicable statutes, network administrators should have the ability to restrict 
VPN connections to the MCEN for those non-essential employees during a furlough and 
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prevent unapproved overtime. Such a technological capability can also be extended 
beyond BYOD to prevent furloughed employees from performing unauthorized work 
from both in-office IT resources and via home systems used for telework. 
The TTB is the only case study subject with a BYOD solution on par with the 
USMC technological solutions being evaluated. For its part during the early fiscal year 
2014 sequestration and associated furlough of government civilians and contractors, the 
TTB suspended Active Directory (AD) accounts for all furloughed employees by 
script.296 The TTB uses RSA devices for remote access, which provides for two-factor 
authentication. Since RSA first checks AD before authenticating, suspending the AD 
accounts blocked both remote access and internal access.297 Thus, furloughed employees 
could not access the organizational network nor have access to any information that 
traverses the TTB network, such as email. A similar solution via the derived credentials 
associated with the USMC BYOD program may be possible to prevent furloughed 
employees from establishing a VPN connection. The better solution would include the 
capability simply to lock the organizational container on devices owned by furloughed 
employees. 
6. Overtime 
An additional concern is overtime or work performed not during normal working 
hours. The FLSA provides guidance regarding overtime pay for employees and states, “a 
nonexempt employee must also be compensated for all work performed outside of normal 
work patterns and paid overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per 
administrative work week.”298 In other words, the employee must be paid for work 
performed and if a way exists for the employer to know that work was performed. 
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Furthermore, the employee must still be paid even if not clearly authorized or directed to 
perform the work in advance.299 
To address this issue, one option is to employ technical controls to restrict access 
to organizational data centers and email outside of normal working hours for nonexempt 
personnel (i.e., time-of-day restrictions). However, this solution may negate the benefit of 
establishing a BYOD program in the first place. Another option is to adopt a policy that 
states nonexempt employees must have a supervisor’s written permission prior to 
conducting work—to include reading and responding to emails—outside of normal 
working hours. This solution also counters the intent and flexibility associated with a 
BYOD program. Additionally, it is impossible to predict the timing of world events and 
emergencies, which makes this solution fairly impractical within most government 
organizations. 
The USMC does possess a technological solution that can track how much an 
individual is logged into the organizational container.300 This being the case, policy can 
be put in place that requires nonexempt employees to not only record all time worked, but 
also time worked while off site and utilizing a personally owned mobile device outside of 
normal working hours. In the event a nonexempt employee reports overtime or a large 
amount of time spent outside of normal working hours, the employee’s claim can be 
verified against the aforementioned USMC organizational container logs. This solution 
does add another layer of bureaucracy to the payroll and time-keeping process. Therefore, 
it will have to be balanced against current practices to ensure the benefits associated with 
a BYOD program outweigh any increased administrative tasks.  
The simplest approach to the overtime issue is to state in the user agreement that 
overtime compensation associated with the use of a personally owned mobile device is 
not authorized without prior approval. In 2014, the United States Attorney’s Office 
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(USAO) under the Department of Justice finalized its BYOD policies and procedures.301 
The USAO policy states, “Overtime compensation is not available simply because a 
BYOD (or GFE) device is used after hours. Rather, the usual rules apply for formally 
requesting and authorizing any overtime compensation.”302 A similar stipulation 
regarding overtime pay is recommended within the USMC BYOD user agreement 
described in Appendix B. 
The possibility exists that most nonexempt employees rarely have the need to 
access email or conduct work outside of normal work patterns. If this is in fact the case, 
then overtime and the amount of work conducted outside of normal working patterns 
because of BYOD, may not be a major concern. However, this consideration is worthy of 
discussion because of the potential for wide use and even abuse (by both managers and 
subordinates) as a result of the inherent flexibility that BYOD introduces. A well-trained 
BYOD workforce backed up with periodic reminders and clear supporting policy can 
mitigate the majority of these concerns. With policy clearly defined, disciplinary action 
can be taken if an employee does not comply. 
A well-trained BYOD workforce includes those in supervisory positions. In the 
event individuals in a leadership position send an email to nonexempt employees outside 
of normal working hours, individuals should include a disclaimer or guidance in the 
opening or subject of the email to protect themselves, as well as the nonexempt employee 
with whom they are communicating. Managers could begin emails sent to nonexempt 
employees by stating whether the email should be addressed immediately or should be 
reviewed and responded to during normal working hours.303 Variants of the 
aforementioned technological and policy solutions can also be applied to teleworkers to 
monitor and control access to the MCEN from home offices. 
                                                 
301 United States Attorneys’ Office, United States Attorneys’ Office Policies and Procedures: Bring 
Your Own Device (BYOD) Program, Telecommunications & Technology Development (TTD) Staff Office 
of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) (no. 3-16-200-017) (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 
2014). 
302 Ibid., 5. 
303 Mathiason et al., The “Bring Your Own Device” to Work Movement: Engineering Practical 
Employment and Labor Law Compliance, 37. 
 84 
Mobile devices certainly make it easy to check and respond to work email during 
the evening or weekend, which blurs the line between work and personal life, and could 
be counted as hours worked. According to a 2011 study by IDC and Unisys, nearly 50 
percent of individuals surveyed reported using personal devices to conduct work while on 
vacation.304 To counter this issue while ensuring adherence to the FLSA, BYOD or 
network administrators could be added to the routing chain for leave requests submitted 
by nonexempt employees. By doing so, administrators can utilize technological solutions 
to disallow BYOD access to the organizational container while a nonexempt employee is 
on leave. The same applies to an unpaid leave of absence. This requirement can also be 
broadened to exempt employees prior to foreign travel whether for business or pleasure. 
In the event it is absolutely necessary to contact a nonexempt employee while on paid or 
unpaid leave, voice communications may still be possible, which eliminates a degree of 
the “fire and forget” mentality often associated with an email. 
With the exception of medical emergencies, policy should also require that an 
employee set various out-of-office notifications on organizational email accounts and 
voicemail greetings to ensure awareness of the employee’s out-of-office status while also 
providing an alternate point of contact should immediate action be required. These ideas 
are certainly not new, as many employees routinely make use of these practices. 
As it relates to BYOD, the work performed outside of normal working hours, as 
well as the aforementioned government furlough scenario, leads to the additional 
question of what constitutes mission critical or essential personnel. As defined in the 
Marine Corps Commercial Mobile Device Strategy, privileged users are individuals who 
the Command identifies as being mission critical or mission essential, and are provided 
mobile government furnished equipment (GFE) or a reimbursement for using their 
commercial mobile device to gain access to their personal organizational data.305 
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Unless an individual falls into the FLSA exempt status, coupled with being 
identified as essential personnel—for example, crisis action team member or in a key 
leadership position—there should be no expectation of being able to readily contact that 
individual outside of normal working hours. Personnel engaged in an “on watch” role, 
such as staff duty officer (SDO) are not included as exempt in this context because a 
government furnished duty phone is typically provided and passed between watch 
standers during turnover to ensure the phone number associated with such positions 
remains constant. Personnel in watch related roles are always expected to be contactable 
while in that position; however, following turnover of this responsibility, that status could 
fall back to nonexempt or at least to non-essential. 
7. BYOD Participation 
Although the Marine Corps’ BYOD program is voluntary, another issue to 
consider is whether every employee should be allowed to participate at the same level of 
remote access. Historically, only privileged users have been allowed remote access to the 
MCEN via mobile devices; however, the DOD is shifting to an environment in which 
remote access is no longer limited to only privileged users.306 Although it may be more 
technologically and administratively cumbersome to establish disparate remote access 
tiers based on a user’s roles and responsibilities, applying the principle of least privilege 
for BYOD can reduce the potential attack surface associated with mobile devices. 
Senior leaders (i.e., Flag or General officers and Senior Executive Service (SES) 
civilians) may not be eligible for BYOD due to the inherently sensitive nature and scope 
of responsibilities. In such cases, government furnished equipment may be the better 
option. 
The USMC will also have to decide whether contractors, foreign nationals, or 
part-time employees are to be allowed to participate. Risks may be further reduced by 
limiting remote access to enterprise resources based on the level of responsibility and 
need for access, or for a particular pay grade range. For example, foreign nationals, 
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contractors, pay grades of E–1 through E–5, and GS–1 through GS–10, may not require 
access to organizational data centers, in which case, an alternate solution may be to limit 
BYOD capabilities to synchronizing email, contacts, and calendars only. This potential 
solution incorporates factors of access control and principles of least privilege, which can 
be enforced via technical controls.  
8. Inappropriate Behavior Creating a Hostile Work Environment 
BYOD participants may feel that personal use of their dual-use device while in 
the workplace is not subject to the same acceptable use policies as if using a government 
furnished device or IT resource. Even with a clear policy in place, managers will likely 
have to deal with a myriad of employee related BYOD challenges associated with the 
personal use of these dual-use devices. Examples range from the potential for the reduced 
productivity associated with personal text messaging, use of social media, cyber-
protesting, and other miscellaneous web-based activity to illegal or criminal activities, 
such as child pornography, fraud, and copyright abuses. Furthermore, BYOD participants 
may feel that because they are using the personal side of their dual-use device, USMC 
equal employment opportunity (EEO) policies do not apply. For instance, employees 
using their personally owned device in the work place may interpret the fact that owning 
the device entitles them to watch vulgar, or otherwise offensive, videos with other 
colleagues.307 These same individuals may also believe that by using commercial Internet 
service providers (ISP) via the personal side of the device somehow insulates them from 
USMC user policy.308 This line of thought can also lead to a hostile work environment if 
an employee—whether through their personal computer or personally owned mobile 
device—posts defamatory comments regarding the organization, peers, or managers 
online. Policy should seek to ensure that employees fully understand the consequences of 
misusing both organizational and personally owned IT resources that could result in a 
hostile work environment or create a negative perception of the USMC and the personnel 
it employs. 
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9. Devices in the Workspace 
An additional consideration is to narrow the meaning of BYOD to limit device 
use in the physical workspace and instead focus on the flexibility that BYOD provides for 
participants while outside the office. This practice would disallow personal mobile 
devices in the work place and mitigate possible security issues associated with the use of 
mobile device microphones and cameras, as well as reduce the potential for employee 
distraction. Barring a clear mission requirement and designated approving authority 
(DAA) and cognizant security authority (CSA) approval, mobile devices are not allowed 
in spaces where classified material is processed and discussed.309 Establishing similar 
guidelines within unclassified spaces where OPSEC and controlled unclassified 
information (CUI) are routinely discussed, will also serve to mitigate risk. Moreover, if 
an employee is working from a physical office, personally owned mobile devices are 
likely not necessary as IT resources and telephony are already provided by the 
organization. Employees should routinely back up organizational data resident within the 
organizational container of the personally owned device to the MCEN so that work can 
be accessed and continued from the office. This practice also ensures work conducted 
within the organizational container is backed up in the event a device is lost or stolen. 
Employees can then leave personal devices in lock boxes and to cover missed calls to the 
personal device, BYOD participants should incorporate a voicemail greeting that 
provides the office phone number where they can be reached during working hours. 
10. BYOD Participant Training 
The creation of a detailed training plan with regard to BYOD is beyond the scope 
of this research. However, training users and managers is undoubtedly a significant 
aspect to any information and IT security program. Organizations should, therefore, 
incorporate aspects of BYOD use into annual security awareness training requirements, 
as well as establish an initial training program that BYOD participants must complete 
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prior to or within a specified timeframe (i.e., within two months) of becoming a BYOD 
participant. A well-trained workforce provides another layer of defense-in-depth to 
protect organizations. Employees should know how, when, and who to contact in the 
event of an incident or suspicious activity, such as unauthorized access, suspicious 
behavior or email content, a lost or stolen device, spillage of classified information, as 
well as best practices for physically protecting a mobile device.310 Physical protection 
and control of the device is the responsibility of the participant. The proposed user 
agreement (Appendix B) includes several physical controls to remind BYOD participants 
of their responsibility to protect personally owned devices, while also providing 
procedures to safeguard personally owned devices. 
In conjunction with annual training requirements, BYOD participants should read 
and sign a new BYOD user agreement, which can also serve as an annual audit of 
participant devices. Training should also address facets of social media use to include 
operational security concerns and the possibility for unauthorized disclosure, as well as 
posts that could create a hostile work environment or EEO violations. Simply using the 
personal side of a mobile device to post online content does not absolve the BYOD 
participant from adhering to USMC policies. 
11. Participation Incentives 
Although a detailed cost analysis and viable BYOD incentive program is outside 
the scope of this research, some monetary incentive is recommended to promote BYOD 
participation and offset a portion of the participant’s monthly mobile costs. For example, 
the USAO sets a “flat fee” BYOD reimbursement cap “(e.g., $20/month in FY2014) for 
each month the employee uses the BYOD device to access the USAO network.”311 
It can be reasonably assumed that there will be three categories of employees as it 
relates to BYOD within the USMC. The first group will readily accept and participate in 
the program, even if it will incur additional monthly costs to the participant. The second 
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group will consist of those employees who will not participate in the BYOD program 
regardless of how much the program is incentivized. The last group is comprised of those 
employees prone to sit on the fence and scrutinize the BYOD program. A reimbursement 
model similar to the USAO’s program should be considered within the USMC BYOD 
program to help increase the participation of those individuals identified within this third 
group. When participation incentives are determined, the amounts, as well as those who 
qualify, should be specified in the user policy and agreement. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter described a myriad of recommendations and additional 
considerations regarding the implementation of the Marine Corps’ BYOD program. This 
list of recommendations and considerations should not be viewed as all inclusive, but 
does provide insight to the challenges that a BYOD policy must attempt to address. In 
fact, several of the considerations addressed in this chapter are not included in the 
proposed user agreement (Appendix B) because they are not necessarily a concern for the 
BYOD participant, but are important to consider in the formulation of the agreement. 
However, the considerations were researched and discussed so that in the event one or 
more of these considerations becomes a problem in the future, this research can be 
utilized as a frame of reference or starting point to make necessary policy adjustments. 
Moreover, several of these BYOD considerations, such as the furlough scenario, can also 
be addressed separately in what might be regarded as a “contingency policy” to avoid 
adding unnecessary length or confusion to the standard BYOD policy. Based on this 
research, the identified controls listed in the proposed user agreement, in conjunction 
with the technical controls inherent with the container solutions under evaluation, can 
make BYOD a reality within the USMC. 
Usability, cost, and security are often at odds with each other in an enterprise 
environment. It is up to the USMC to decide whether the residual risks introduced by 
their BYOD solution are acceptable or are balanced acceptably by the benefits of BYOD. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this thesis examined the importance of policy as it relates to BYOD 
programs, and the factors necessary for developing a BYOD user policy and agreement 
for the USMC. Furthermore, research was conducted on the applicable security controls, 
technological solutions, acceptable use policies, and user privacy considerations that 
accompany a BYOD program. Thorough examination of the aforementioned has resulted 
in a BYOD user agreement tailored to the USMC’s technological solution, as shown in 
Appendix B. Although the user agreement exceeded the goal of three to six pages in 
length, the proposed user agreement answers the primary thesis question in the 
affirmative: it is possible to develop a BYOD user agreement that minimizes risk for all 
parties while also allowing for the intended flexibility. If formatted in a similar fashion as 
the user policies researched, the proposed user agreement is seven pages long. As is 
discussed below in Limitations, once a SAAR is finalized, redundant controls can be 
removed, which would shorten the proposed BYOD user agreement. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The researchers recognize the following limitations to their research. 
• Although the general technical approach for implementing a BYOD 
program via an organizational container has been identified, the final 
vendor solution will not be determined until after completion of the pilot 
program. As a result, if the USMC decides to change its technical solution 
for BYOD, it will require minor modifications to the proposed user 
agreement, depending on which vendor solution is selected. The first 
phase of the pilot program is anticipated to be complete in May 2015, 
which is several months after this research has been completed; 
consequently, findings and lessons learned from this first phase are not 
available and cannot be incorporated into this research. 
• The researchers were unable to conduct research on every organization 
that has successfully implemented a BYOD program. As such, the 
comparison of the three applicable case studies, as well as the lessons 
learned and best practices derived from research, represent a limited 
sample size. Notwithstanding, the three applicable case studies did provide 
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sufficient insight into the differing methods by which an organization can 
and have implemented a BYOD program. 
• The USMC recently distributed a BYOD survey to gauge employee 
interest and opinions regarding BYOD implementation. Survey results 
were not collected or available for analysis during the period of this 
research; however, these survey results will prove valuable in the 
development of a BYOD incentive program. 
• At the time of this research, the USMC was in the process of transitioning 
from the current DD Form 2875 SAAR to an updated version. As a result, 
some of the security controls listed in the proposed BYOD user agreement 
may be redundant to the security controls present in the standard user 
agreement for government IT resources. The proposed BYOD user 
agreement includes all controls that this research identified as necessary to 
mitigate risk to the greatest extent possible based on the USMC’s 
technological approach. Once the USMC finalizes the new SAAR, 
controls identified as redundant within the BYOD user agreement can be 
removed to make the proposed agreement more succinct. 
• The researchers recognize that although a considerable amount of research 
went into crafting the proposed user agreement, they are not qualified to 
make legal decisions on behalf of the USMC. Therefore, the proposed user 
agreement will require legal review prior to acceptance. 
C. TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following items have been identified as potential topics for follow-on 
research. 
1. Virtual Mobile Infrastructure  
During the course of this research, Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (VMI) was 
identified as a favorable solution for BYOD implementation. VMI provides an alternate 
technological solution by creating an environment similar to that established by the TTB 
(as described in Chapter II). Additionally, VMI ensures that all organizational 
information remains within organizational data centers vice resident on the mobile 
device. Furthermore, based on limited research associated with this thesis, VMI may 
provide a more secure and easier to manage BYOD program. However, the VMI solution 
is estimated to cost over $80 per user annually, whereas client access licenses for 
organizational containers will cost around $40 per user annually.312 Acknowledging that 
                                                 
312 Anderson, September 23, 2014. 
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reducing costs is one of the primary considerations prior to implementing a BYOD 
program, the VMI price point is currently too high and the return on investment does not 
justify adopting VMI at this time. Should this solution become more cost effective, and 
subsequently, become adopted by the USMC or broader DOD to support BYOD, further 
research will be required to evaluate the necessary security controls to support this 
technology. 
2. BYOD Incentive Program 
An underlying objective in implementing a BYOD program is to enhance 
employee flexibility and productivity, while also realizing cost savings to the 
organization. Pending the outcome of the USMC pilot program, and as BYOD becomes 
more prevalent within the DOD, a study to determine the feasibility of BYOD incentive 
programs for both the USMC and the DOD is a topic for future research. Incentive 
programs, such as reimbursement, split-billing, or stipends, could potentially promote 
employee participation to allow for an organization to more effectively capitalize on the 
underlying objectives that a BYOD program offers. Topics worth examining are the 
following. 
• If an incentive program is implemented, which approach would ensure 
that cost savings for the organization are realized, while at the same time, 
making BYOD an attractive solution for potential participants? 
• Based on amount reimbursable, how will it be paid to participants (i.e., 
stipend, reimbursement, split-billing)? 
• Who will be reimbursed (e.g., all participants to include contractors and 
foreign nationals, or limited to individuals identified as essential 
personnel, etc.)? 
• If a reimbursement program is feasible, a study should address policy 
formulation, specifically outlining the processes and procedures involved 
with requesting reimbursement. 
3. Expanding Scope to Bring Your Own Computer  
The DOD Mobile Device Strategy recognizes the potential advantages that mobile 
devices provide to the workforce and their capability to “advance the operational 
effectiveness of the Department of Defense.”313 Assuming the success of the USMC 
                                                 
313 Department of Defense, DOD Mobile Device Strategy, Department of Defense Memorandum, i. 
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BYOD program, and subsequent incorporation of personally-owned devices on DOD 
networks, a topic for future research would be the expansion of the BYOD concept to 
include personally-owned computers. Similar to mobile devices, many employees prefer 
their own laptops vice the standard client hardware furnished by parent organizations. 
Leveraging an employee’s personal hardware has the potential to produce additional cost 
savings for the DOD, as well as alleviate DOD lifecycle costs and the periodic purchase 
of new client systems. 
4. Government Furnished Wireless Access Points  
The demand for wireless access points (AP)’s on government and military 
installations is increasing. For a user to capitalize on the flexibility that a personally-
owned mobile device provides, it is expected that users will want to establish connections 
to these wireless AP’s. Assuming wireless AP’s become available within USMC 
installations, further research will be required to examine how the USMC will monitor 
personal traffic traversing the USMC enterprise wireless network and USMC-provided 
guest networks. 
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APPENDIX A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY 
ORGANIZATION SECURITY CONTROLS 
In accordance with the research and policy development methodology described 
in Chapter IV, the tables in this appendix provide a complete list of the user agreement 
controls implemented by the three case study organizations (the TTB, the EEOC and the 
CPG). The case study controls are utilized to create a baseline for comparison between 
the organizations researched and to identify those security controls necessary to address 
the USMC’s BYOD security requirements. 
The first column of each table, titled “security objective/concern addressed,” 
identifies the overarching IA security objective or concern that each associated control is 
intended to address. The details listed in this column centers on the practice of IA and the 
associated objectives of CIA; however, research attempts to also identify a more specific 
information assurance and security objective vice simply listing one of the CIA triad 
components. For example, the security capability to enforce the use of a password or PIN 
to protect a personally owned device supports the principles of confidentiality and 
integrity for data resident on the device. Access control and authentication are also listed 
to describe the “security objective/concern addressed” in more detail beyond just 
confidentiality and integrity. Many, if not most, of the controls involve aspects of all 
three CIA triad components; however, research has attempted to focus on the most 
prevalent security objective that each control is intended to address. 
The second column of each table identifies the USMC security requirement that 
each case study policy control supports. The three primary security requirements as 
identified by the USMC are secure remote authentication, device OS integrity, and the 
control and protection of organizational data and networks. A particular case study 
security capability may address only one of these security requirements, but in some 
cases, two or all three of the security requirements are addressed to the same level of 
importance. For example, the case study security capability that requires users to log off 
and disconnect from the VPN when done working, addresses both the secure remote 
authentication and protection of organizational data, as well as network requirements. 
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Although this control could also have implications for OS integrity, it is not the most 
prevalent concern associated with this control, and thus, is not listed. Similar to the first 
column, and where possible, attempts have been made to identify the primary security 
requirement(s) that each policy control supports. 
The third column of each table, titled “case study security capabilities/controls,” 
identifies a specific security control listed within each of the case study user agreements. 
These security controls may be specific to only one of the case study organizations or 
common to multiple case study organizations. Efforts also combined those case study 
user agreement controls with a common intent. For example, the EEOC’s BYOD user 
agreement states that email will be wiped following 25 failed password attempts, whereas 
the CPG will initiate a remote wipe following 10 unsuccessful attempts to enter the 
correct PIN. These controls have been combined in the tables to read “device wipe 
following set number of failed password or PIN attempts.” The fourth column of each 
table, titled “case study organization,” identifies those studied organizations that apply 
the associated control. 
The fifth column of each table, titled “SP-800-53 controls,” identifies those 
controls from the NIST SP-800-53 publication that relate to each of the case study 
security capabilities and controls listed in column three. Many of the SP-800-53 controls 
provide a degree of overlap and redundancy to achieve a particular security capability. 
The NIST SP-800-53 states, “the concept of security capability is a construct that 
recognizes that the protection of information being processed, stored, or transmitted by 
information systems, seldom derives from a single safeguard or countermeasure (i.e., 
security control). In most cases, such protection results from the selection and 
implementation of a set of mutually reinforcing security controls.”314 With the 
understanding that a security capability rarely relies on just one SP-800-53 control, 
multiple controls are required and identified to meet each of the case study organization’s 
security capabilities. The presence of an “E” in the “SP-800-53 controls” column 
                                                 
314 Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, and National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(U.S.), Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 21. 
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identifies the security control enhancement associated with a particular SP-800-53 control 
category. 
A line-by-line review was performed on all 18 SP-800-53 control families, and 
associated security controls and enhancements to identify the NIST controls that mapped 
to the technologies or controls identified within the three case studies, whether partially 
or fully. The mapped SP-800-53 controls were then compared to the NIST SP-800-124 
and GAO-12-757 to mitigate the possibility of overlooking applicable controls. The 
aforementioned analysis methodology, as well as the overlap and redundancy inherent 
with most SP-800-53 controls, helps minimize the potential that a required BYOD user 
policy control was not identified. 
Finally, the case study security capabilities and controls have been separated into 
four tables by the categories of personnel (Table 2), technical (Table 3), operating (Table 
4), and physical (Table 5) as described in Chapter IV. 
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Requirement Supported  






     
Availability: Network 
security and user 
productivity 
Protection and control of 




Employees are prohibited from 
using organizational resources 
for accessing unauthorized 















control of data 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Technical solution allows access 
to organizational email through 
the Internet, but policy prohibits 
users from downloading 
organizational data to the 











protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Log off and disconnect from 










Requirement Supported  








and data control, privacy 
protection 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Protect PII. Do not download, 
email or transfer sensitive 
business data or PII to a 

















protection of data-at-rest 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Authorized storage of sensitive 
organizational information on an 
organizational approved device 











and data control 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
User agrees to delete any 
sensitive organizational 
files/data that may be 
inadvertently downloaded and 









principle of least 
privilege 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
VPN access through BYOD is 
available to senior executives or 













Requirement Supported  








Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Users must have a need to 










User safety  Abide by the law governing the 
use of mobile cell phones and 









Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
 
Third party file sharing and 
Internet backup services, such as 
Dropbox and iCloud cannot be 










Availability: data control Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
All material that passes through 
the Company network or that is 
stored on Mobile Devices—
including personally owned 
Mobile Devices—for the 
purpose of conducting business 














Requirement Supported  







control and unauthorized 
disclosure 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Users must not employ any 
email address other than an 
official company email address 









Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Inadvertent disclosure—be 
professional and exercise 
caution when using social 
networking, email, instant 
















access, modification and 
protection of data-at- rest 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Do not access, browse, research, 
or change any account, file, 
data, record, or application not 


















Requirement Supported  








Integrity: data control, 
unauthorized disclosure, 
system and network 
security 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Privately owned equipment shall 
not be connected to 









     





Requirement Supported  











of data-in- transit, privacy 
protection 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Sensitive data or PII must be 












Requirement Supported  














device OS integrity; 
protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Do not install or use 
























and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Only use provided and properly 
configured equipment and 
software to remote access 





















Requirement Supported  











and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
To establish a VPN connection 
the device must be capable of at 

















Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
User will password protect the 









Integrity: access control, 
network security, 
protection of data-at-rest 
Maintain device OS 
integrity, protection and 
control of organizational 
network and data 
User agrees to maintain the 






















Requirement Supported  







Integrity: access control, 
network security and 
protection of data-at-rest 
Maintain device OS 
integrity; protection and 
control of organizational 
network and data 



















Integrity: Access control, 
unauthorized disclosure 
or modification 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Device wipe following set 












Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Users must comply with EEOC 
password policies (password 










Requirement Supported  







Integrity: Access control, 
protection of data-at-rest 
and in-transit, network 
security 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Only BYODs that provide FIPS 
140-2 device level encryption 














Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
User will enable use of a second 
strong password for 
authentication upon connecting 








Integrity: Access control, 




Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
User will maintain anti-virus 

















Requirement Supported  








Integrity: Access control, 
network security 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Users must allow administrators 

















Maintain device OS 
integrity and protection and 
control of organizational 
network and data 
Users must allow administrators 
to install mobile device 















Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Location Services must be 















Requirement Supported  







Integrity: Access control, 
unauthorized disclosure 
or modification, network 
security, configuration 
management 
Maintain device OS 
integrity; protection and 
control of organizational 
network and data 
Do not tamper with enabled 
security configurations— 
security settings will be 
enforced by the mobile device 
management client on all mobile 
devices that contain company 




















Integrity: Access control, 
unauthorized disclosure 
or modification, network 
security 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 







Integrity: Access control, 
unauthorized disclosure 
or modification, 
protection of data-at-rest 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Devices will have the capability 















Requirement Supported  











and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Only Apple iOS iPad devices 







Cost management, device 
accountability, access 
control 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Termination of service due to 30 











Authentication to the 
organizational VPN requires 
two factors: RSA secure ID 









or modification, network 
security 
Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Technical controls prevent 
employees from saving any data 
either from or onto a local 
computer while connected to the 
VPN; 
*Container prevents the transfer 
of organizational data outside 
the container or the transfer of 
















Protection and control of 
organizational network and 
data 
Only Android, iOS and 
BlackBerry devices are allowed 
within BYOD program 
EEOC AC-19 
AC-20(E3) 
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Requirement Supported  













security, insider threat 
Secure remote 
authentication; maintain 
device OS integrity; 
protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Promptly report all security 
incidents regardless of how 
insignificant they may appear to 
include suspicious activity and 
















and control of 
organizational network 
and data 










Protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 







Integrity: Data discovery, 
unauthorized 
modification or removal 
of data 
Protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Legal hold—the organization 
may need to access all data 
stored on a device; user must 
get company approval prior to 













Requirement Supported  














device OS integrity; 
protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Notify the company if a local 
government agency or outside 
organization seizes your mobile 
device. Device must be 










Integrity: Access control, 
unauthorized disclosure 
or modification, device 
accountability 
Protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Remote wipe as a result of 













and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Employees may not make any 
remote connection via TTB’s 
VPN to any TTB network 
























Requirement Supported  









logical access control 
Secure remote 
authentication; maintain 
device OS integrity; 
protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Protect all authentication 
credentials (RSA secure ID, 














device OS integrity; 
protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Do not program your 










access disclosure or 
modification, physical 
security 
Protection and control of 
organizational network 
and data 
Personnel should take every 
precaution to physically protect 
device—Examples include: 
locking in a safe if on travel, 
keeping it on your person, do 











and logical access 
control, physical security 
Maintain device OS 
integrity; protection and 
control of organizational 
network and data 
User will not share the device 








Table 6 includes each unique SP-800-53 security control that aligned with at least 
one policy standard from the case study organizations’ BYOD policies (column five from 
the above tables). These controls are highlighted in yellow. The SP-800-53 controls that 
are not highlighted have been identified as having applicability to the USMC BYOD 
program, but did not align with any of the policy standards listed in the case study user 
agreements. This table is not meant to be an inclusive list of all the security controls 
required to minimize risk within a BYOD program. Rather, it lists those security controls 
from the SP-800-53 that either technically enforce a participant’s acceptable use of a 
personally owned device within a BYOD program, or are recommended in this thesis for 
inclusion within a user agreement to minimize risk due to personal use of a dual-use 
device in conjunction with the MCEN. 
At the time of this research, the FIPS-199 impact levels assigned to the USMC 
BYOD program and the MCEN were not readily available. Per NIST, a system is 
assigned an impact level of low, moderate, or high, and is based on the “impact on an 
organization should certain events occur which jeopardize the information and 
information systems needed by the organization to accomplish its assigned mission, 
protect its assets, fulfill its legal responsibilities, maintain its day-to-day functions, and 
protect individuals.”315 Based on the findings of this research, the USMC BYOD 
program should be assigned an impact level of moderate or higher. The identified SP-
800-53 security controls listed below have been matched to the appropriate impact level, 
so that as the USMC identifies the impact level of the BYOD program, a viable baseline 
of BYOD security controls is available and tailored to the USMC BYOD technological 
solution. As per the SP-800-53, an “X” indicates the associated security control is 
required as a baseline to meet the identified impact level (i.e., low, moderate, high). If the 
cell is blank, the security control or control enhancement is not required for the security 
control baseline, but is available for increased protection. To reiterate, the identified 
controls in Table 6 are primarily applicable to the user experience, procedures, and 
processes in the formulation of user agreements vice an all-inclusive list of controls 
                                                 
315 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Standards for Security Categorization of 
Federal Information and Information Systems, 1. 
 114 
required for BYOD implementation. The SP-800-53 and SP-800-124 should be 
referenced for a complete list of required security controls. 
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Table 6.   Security Control Baseline for BYOD Impact Level316 
 SP-800-53 Control Number Control or Control Enhancement name 
Impact Level 
 Low Moderate High 
 AC-2 Account Management X X X 
 AC-2(E3) Disable Inactive Accounts   X X 
 AC-2(E5) Inactivity Logout     X 
 AC-2(E11) Usage Conditions     X 
 AC-2(E12) Account Monitoring/Atypical Usage     X 
 AC-2(E13) 
Disable Accounts for High-Risk 
Individuals     X 
 AC-3 Access Enforcement X X X 
 AC-3(E9) Controlled Release       
 AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement   X X 
 AC-4(E22) Access Only       
 AC-5 Separation of Duties   X X 
 AC-6 Least Privilege   X X 
 AC-6(E10) 
Prohibit Non-Privileged Users from 
Executing Privileged Functions   X X 
 AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts X X X 
 AC-7(E2) Purge/Wipe Mobile Devices       
 AC-8 System Use Notification X X X 
 AC-11 Session Lock   X X 
 AC-12 Session Termination   X X 
 AC-17 Remote Access X X X 
                                                 
316 Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), Security and Privacy Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations, D1–D43. 
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 SP-800-53 Control Number Control or Control Enhancement name 
Impact Level 
 Low Moderate High 
 AC-17(E1) Automated Monitoring/Control   X X 
 AC-17(E2) 
Protection of Confidentiality/Integrity 
Using Encryption   X X 
 AC-17(E6) Protection of Information       
 AC-17(E9) Disconnect/Disable Access       
 AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices X X X 
 AC-19(E4) Restrictions for Classified Information       
 AC-19(E5) 
Full Device/Container-Based 
Encryption   X X 
 AC-20 
Use of External Information 
Systems X X X 
 AC-20(E3) 
Non-Organizationally Owned 
Systems/Components/Devices       
 AC-20(E4) Network Accessible Storage Devices       
 AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content X X X 
 AT-2 Security Awareness Training X X X 
 AT-3 Role-Based Security Training X X X 
 AT-3(E2) Physical Security Controls       
 AT-3(E4) 
Suspicious Communications and 
Anomalous System Behavior       
 AU-2 Audit Events X X X 
 AU-13 
Monitoring for Information 
Disclosure       
 AU-14 Session Audit       
 CA-7 Continuous Monitoring X X X 
 CA-9 Internal System Connections X X X 
 CM-2 Baseline Configuration X X X 
 CM-2(E2) Automation Support for     X 
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 SP-800-53 Control Number Control or Control Enhancement name 
Impact Level 
 Low Moderate High 
Accuracy/Currency 
 CM-2(E7) 
Configure Systems, Components, or 
Devices for High-Risk Areas   X X 
 CM-6 Configuration Settings X X X 
 CM-6(E2) Respond to Unauthorized Changes     X 
 CM-7 Least Functionality X X X 
 CM-7(E4) Unauthorized Software/Blacklisting   X   
 CM-7(E5) Authorized Software/Whitelisting     X 
 CM-8 
Information System Component 
Inventory X X X 
 CM-8(E3) 
Automated Unauthorized Component 
Detection   X X 
 CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions X X X 
 CM-11 User-Installed Software X X X 
 CM-11(E1) Alerts for Unauthorized Installations       
 IA-2 Identification and Authentication X X X 
 IA-2(E2) 
Network Access to Non-Privileged 
Accounts   X X 
 IA-3 
Device Identification and 
Authentication   X X 
 IA-4 Identifier Management X X X 
 IA-5 Authenticator Management X X X 
 IA-5(E1) Password-Based Authentication X X X 
 IA-5(E2) PKI-Based Authentication   X X 
 IA-5(E3) 
In-Person or Trusted Third-Party 
Registration   X X 
 IA-5(E4) 
Automated Support for Password 
Strength Determination       
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 SP-800-53 Control Number Control or Control Enhancement name 
Impact Level 
 Low Moderate High 
 IA-5(E11) 
Hardware Token-Based 
Authentication X X X 
 IR-6 Incident Reporting X X X 
 IR-9 Information Spillage Response       
 MA-2 Controlled Maintenance X X X 
 MP-6 Media Sanitization X X X 
 MP-6(E8) 
Remote Purging/Wiping of 
Information       
 MP-7 Media Use X X X 
 PE-20 Asset Monitoring and Tracking       
 PL-4 Rules of Behavior X X X 
 PL-4(E1) 
Social Media and Networking 
Restrictions   X X 
 PL-8 Information Security Architecture   X X 
 PS-1 
Personnel Security Policy and 
Procedures X X X 
 PS-3 Personnel Screening X X X 
 PS-4 Personnel Termination X X X 
 PS-5 Personnel Transfer X X X 
 PS-6 Access Agreements X X X 
 PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security X X X 
 PS-8 Personnel Sanctions X X X 
 SA-9 
External Information System 
Services X X X 
 SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection       
 SA-18(E2) 
Inspection of Information Systems, 
Components, or Devices       
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 SP-800-53 Control Number Control or Control Enhancement name 
Impact Level 
 Low Moderate High 
 SC-3 Security Function Isolation     X 
 SC-4 Information in Shared Resources   X X 
 SC-7 Boundary Protection X X X 
 SC-7(E7) 
Prevent Split Tunneling for Remote 
Devices X X X 
 SC-8 
Transmission Confidentiality and 
Integrity   X X 
 SC-8(E1) 
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical 
Protection   X X 
 SC-10 Network Disconnect   X X 
 SC-13 Cryptographic Protection X X X 
 SC-25 Thin Nodes       
 SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest   X X 
 SC-28(E1) Cryptographic Protection   X X 
 SC-38 Operations Security       
 SC-41 Port and I/O Device Access       
 SC-42(E2) Authorized Use       
 SC-43 Usage Restrictions       
 SI-3 Malicious Code Protection X X X 
 SI-4 Information System Monitoring X X X 
 SI-7 
Software, Firmware, and 
Information Integrity   X X 
 SI-7(E2) 
Automated Notifications of Integrity 
Violations     X 
 SI-7(E7) Integration of Detection and Response   X X 
 SI-7(E9) Verify Boot Process       
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Other than a few exceptions, the security controls in the SP-800-53 catalog, “have 
been designed to be policy- and technology-neutral. This means that security controls and 
control enhancements focus on the fundamental safeguards and countermeasures 
necessary to protect information during processing, while in storage, and during 
transmission.”317 Simply because a control is listed in the SP-800-53, or identified in a 
case study user policy, does not mean that it should be included in the USMC policy. For 
this reason, understanding the technology that the policy is designed to support is vital so 
that the implemented controls are both meaningful and relevant.318 Furthermore, the need 
to provide sufficient security extends beyond the implementation of any one safeguard 
associated with a particular technology. The recommended safeguards or controls 
provided in Appendix B (the proposed USMC BYOD user agreement) in support of the 
USMC BYOD program have been analyzed based on the methodology described in 
Chapter IV for their applicability to support the technological solutions under evaluation 
by the USMC. 
                                                 
317 Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, and National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(U.S.), Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, ix. 
318 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX B. PROPOSED BRING-YOUR-OWN-DEVICE USER 
AGREEMENT 
BYOD User Agreement 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BRING-YOUR-OWN-DEVICE (BYOD) 
USER AGREEMENT 
PURPOSE & OBJECTIVE: 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) program 
allows for the use of an approved commercial mobile device (CMD) of the employee’s 
choice to access Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) resources. The BYOD 
program intends to reduce costs associated with the issuance of Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) while fostering enhanced productivity as it allows participants to 
access, disseminate and manipulate USMC and U.S. Government data from non-
traditional work places in order to support mission requirements. As such, this document 
establishes the USMC’s policy regarding acceptable use of personally-owned mobile 
devices within the BYOD program. 
This BYOD agreement aims to inform BYOD participants of their responsibilities as well 
as the potential consequences if guidelines contained within this agreement are not 
followed. Furthermore, this agreement seeks to minimize risk to our people, the MCEN 
and the data it contains by establishing acceptable use practices for conducting work and 
while connected to the MCEN via your mobile device. Failure to adhere to the guidelines 
listed in this agreement may result in disciplinary action, personal liability and 
termination of BYOD privileges. 
A commercial mobile device is a handheld computing device with a display screen that 
allows for user input (e.g., touch screen, keyboard). When connected to a network, it 
enables the sharing of information in formats specially designed to maximize the use of 
information, given device limitations (i.e., screen size, computing power). Mobile devices 
provide the capabilities of conventional desktops or laptop computers in a more portable 
package. Examples of popular mobile devices include smart phones and tablets. Mobile 
devices approved for use in this BYOD program are provided at 
https://aplits.disa.mil/processAPList.action—type “mobile device” into the “key words” 
search field.  
The Organizational Container present on a personally-owned mobile device is owned 
by the United States Marine Corps. This container securely partitions the device to ensure 
that organizational data and work related functions remain separate and isolated from the 
personal side of the device, thus creating a dual-use capability that helps address both 
security and user privacy concerns. 
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Organizational Data is the property of the U.S. Federal Government and consists of any 
data accessed, stored, manipulated, processed or transmitted within or through the 
organizational container. 
Remote Wipe: Devices must have the capability to receive a remote command to 
perform a remote wipe. In the event of a lost or stolen device and the transfer or 
termination of employment, the USMC will initiate a remote wipe to erase only the 
organizational container resident on the personally-owned device. 
Legal Hold is a process that permits the U.S. Federal Government to preserve all forms 
of relevant information as a result of current or anticipated litigation, audit or government 
investigation. In the event of a court ordered legal hold for data discovery, a BYOD 
participant is required to preserve all documents and electronically stored information 
(ESI) associated with an investigation, lawsuit, or audit. 
SCOPE: 
This agreement applies to any employee (military, civilian and contractor) who decides to 
participate in this BYOD program and uses a personally-owned mobile device to access 
MCEN resources and services. Individuals covered by this agreement are referred to as 
Mobile Device Users or BYOD participants. This program is voluntary and offered to all 
full-time employees. No employee should be pressured into participating and only 
individuals identified as “mission essential” personnel are given the expectation of being 
contactable outside of existing work patterns. 
PRIVACY: 
Employees assume some level of risk by participating in this BYOD program. The 
USMC will NOT violate an individual’s right to privacy associated with personal use of 
the device while conducting activities outside of the organizational container, unless a 
violation of this agreement is suspected or detected. 
1. The USMC will not and cannot remotely access personal data on an employee’s 
personally-owned device residing outside of the Organizational Container. 
2. Monitoring: BYOD participants shall use the Organizational Container and associated 
MCEN resources with the understanding that such use serves as consent to monitoring of 
any type of use, including incidental and personal uses, whether authorized or 
unauthorized.  
Activities conducted on the personal side of a device shall utilize commercial Internet or 
cellular service to send and receive traffic. Therefore, activities conducted outside of the 
organizational container are not monitored or seen by the USMC.  
3. Remote Wiping: When a Remote wipe command is required, it is designed to erase 
only the data residing in the Organizational Container without affecting any personal data 




This acceptable use policy (AUP) has been generated in accordance with applicable laws 
and regulations and must be adhered to in order to protect employees, the organization, 
networks and data. Appropriate use of Federal Government communications systems and 
electronic media in accordance with DOD Directives, Instructions and regulations also 
apply while using the organizational container resident on a personally-owned mobile 
device.  
Mobile Device Users are responsible for protecting U.S. Government data, keeping the 
device itself secure, immediately reporting security incidents and the loss or theft of 
devices, allowing BYOD administrators to remote wipe (delete) the organizational 
container as required, and to access the organizational container for data discovery in the 
event of a legal hold or spillage of classified data. 
Participation in the USMC BYOD program is granted on the condition that an individual: 
(1)  has a requirement to access USMC resources; 
(2)  completes applicable training requirements; 
(a)  DOD Information Assurance Awareness Training; 
(b)  Personal Identifiable Information Training; 
(c)  Smartphones and Tablets Appropriate Use modules; 
(d)  Portable Electronic Devices & Removable Storage Media training. 
(3)  submits a BYOD System Access Authorization Request (SAAR); 
(4)  reads, signs and adheres to the BYOD acceptable use policies as described 
in this document. 
Additional standards and controls specific to the use of personally-owned mobile devices 
within the USMC BYOD program are identified in this agreement. 
PERSONNEL CONTROLS are dependent upon program administration and user 
adherence to this agreement. 
1. Only unclassified official business shall be conducted within the organizational 
container and while connected to the MCEN. BYOD participants are prohibited from 
accessing unauthorized content (such as pornography, hacker sites, and gambling sites) 
via the USMC organizational container and virtual private network (VPN) connection. 
2. If a BYOD participant is suspected of using his/her personally-owned mobile device to 
conduct illegal activity or to access unauthorized content via the VPN connection, the 
organizational container will be locked and BYOD privileges will be terminated. 
Suspected illegal activity will be reported to appropriate civil authorities and the 
participant’s device could be confiscated as evidence. 
3. Use of the organizational container on a personally-owned device is subject to the 
same policies as using an unclassified U.S. Government IT resource and is not authorized 
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to access, store or transmit classified data or otherwise unauthorized content. Personally-
owned mobile devices shall not be used to discuss classified information. 
4. Reasonable personal use of a mobile device during working hours is allowed but it 
shall not interfere with organizational activities or the employee’s official 
responsibilities. Excessive personal use of a mobile device during working hours for 
other than official or authorized use may result in adverse administrative or disciplinary 
action. Personal use of a mobile device should be conducted outside of the organizational 
container and during the employee’s personal time (i.e. during lunch periods, official 
breaks, or outside of normal working hours).   
5. Do not access, browse, research, or change any account, file, data or application 
outside the scope of assigned duties. 
6. BYOD participants must disconnect the remote session and log out of the 
organizational container when work will be interrupted for more than five minutes. 
BYOD participants must also lock the device when not in use. 
7. Do not employ any email address to conduct official business other than an official 
USMC email address. 
8. Do not physically connect or synchronize personally-owned mobile devices to a 
government system. Participants are responsible for periodically backing up 
organizational data resident within the organizational container to the MCEN. 
9. Terminate the VPN connection and log out of the organizational container prior to 
connecting the personally-owned device to another personally-owned device (e.g., 
personal computer, storage or any other external device). 
10. Do not attempt to synchronize, backup or transfer government data to non-
government systems, mobile devices, third party file sharing services or cloud based 
storage services, such as iCloud and Dropbox. Do not email government information to a 
personal email account (i.e., Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo, etc.) in an attempt to bypass this 
control. 
11. BYOD participants are legally liable for posted content on the Internet (which 
includes social media sites) and can be disciplined by the USMC for commentary, 
content or images that are defamatory, pornographic, proprietary, harassing, libelous or 
that can create a hostile work environment. Utilizing a personally-owned mobile device 
within the workplace to access vulgar content or content that could otherwise be 
interpreted as offensive is prohibited. Standing Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 
and sexual assault/harassment policies apply. 
12. Be professional and exercise caution when using social networking, email, instant 
messaging and chat rooms as lapses can result in unauthorized disclosures of sensitive 
information and operations security (OPSEC) violations. 
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13. Unless authorized, BYOD participants will not post organizational content online. 
14. Overtime compensation is not available simply because a BYOD participant utilizes a 
personally-owned device to conduct work after hours. If overtime is required based on 
work performed via a personally-owned device outside of normal working hours, BYOD 
participants must first obtain authorization from a supervisor. 
15. Personally-owned mobile devices are not allowed in areas where classified 
information is stored, processed, discussed or transmitted. 
16. BYOD participants will abide by the law governing the use of mobile devices while 
driving or conducting any other activity covered by legal restrictions. Where legally 
approved, the use of hands-free equipment is recommended. 
TECHNICAL CONTROLS enforce or promote compliance to this agreement 
through technological capabilities. 
1. BYOD participants must register their personally-owned mobile device with USMC 
BYOD administrators through the submission of a SAAR. The participant will then 
download the container application from the appropriate application store (e.g. Apple 
Store for iOS devices). BYOD administrators will email the participant an enterprise 
activation code, as well as guidance to properly configure the personally-owned device. 
The container application and device security settings are required for remote 
authentication and access to the MCEN. If the device is not properly configured, access 
to the MCEN will not be allowed. 
2. Do not alter or tamper with enabled security configurations. Technical solutions are in 
place to detect configuration changes and enforce proper settings. Mobile devices outside 
of acceptable risk parameters will not be allowed access to the organizational container 
until the proper settings are reestablished. 
3. A PIN (or similar access mechanism depending on the type of device) is required to 
unlock the personally-owned device. 
4. A username and password is required to access the organizational container. The 
password required to access the organizational container must be changed every 90 days 
and comply with DOD complexity requirements. 
5. Mobile device users will comply with DOD password and PIN policies. PINs and 
passwords must be protected and the PIN required to establish a VPN connection will be 
different from the PIN necessary to access the device. Do not make an attempt to bypass 
access control measures. 
6. Authentication to the USMC VPN requires two factors. In order to establish a VPN 
connection, users must have derived credentials loaded in the organizational container 
and the associated PIN. The VPN connector and derived credentials will be installed 
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within the organizational container on the BYOD participant’s device following the 
review and signature of this agreement and the submission of a SAAR.  
7. The organizational container will be locked and the VPN connection will be 
automatically disconnected following five minutes of inactivity. This does not excuse the 
user from logging out of the organizational container and disconnecting the remote 
session when work will be interrupted for more than five minutes. The device itself will 
also be set to lock after one minute of inactivity. 
8. The ability to establish a VPN connection will be disabled following five unsuccessful 
attempts to enter the correct PIN. Similarly, access to the organizational container will be 
locked following five unsuccessful login attempts. In both cases, BYOD administrators 
must be contacted to unlock the account and reestablish access. 
9. Do not modify or use unauthorized mobile device hardware. 
10. Do not install or use unauthorized software within the organizational container. 
Unauthorized software includes, but is not limited to, hacking tools, opt-in botnet 
software and other attack tool technologies, peer-to-peer software (e.g. Napster, 
LimeWire), and non-business related third-party applications. Applications authorized for 
use within the organizational container are available for download from approved 
enterprise application stores only. 
11. Sensitive U.S. Government data and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) stored 
or processed on a personally-owned mobile device must be encrypted. Such information 
must also be encrypted prior to transmission. All data stored within the organizational 
container is automatically encrypted. Any effort to circumvent this encryption is strictly 
prohibited. 
12. The BYOD participant is responsible for promptly applying available patches and 
maintaining proper configuration settings. BYOD participants agree to maintain the 
original device operating system (OS). 
13. BYOD participants will not attempt to root or jailbreak any mobile device utilized 
within the USMC BYOD program. Rooting or jailbreaking a device means that the user 
bypasses security restrictions to elevate user privileges to alter device settings, install 
otherwise unauthorized third-party software and applications, as well as modify the OS 
and file systems. Technical solutions are in place to detect a compromised OS. Any 
attempt to root or jailbreak a device will, at a minimum, result in the termination of 
BYOD privileges and a remote wipe of the organizational container. 
14. Technical controls are in place to prevent the transfer of organizational data from the 
organizational container to the personal side of the device and vice versa. Do not attempt 
to circumvent this separation. 
15. BYOD participant accounts that go unused for 30 consecutive days will be locked. If 
no attempts are made to unlock the organizational container for an additional 30 days, a 
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remote wipe of the organizational container will be initiated. Employees must re-enroll if 
they decide to continue participation in the future. 
OPERATING CONTROLS provide the procedures and processes to manage device 
accountability and prevent or resolve BYOD incidents. 
1. BYOD participants will promptly report all security incidents regardless of how 
insignificant they may appear. Security incidents include, but are not limited to: 
suspicious activity; anomalous or erratic device operation; missing or added files; the 
possible disclosure of sensitive but unclassified information (i.e. PII and OPSEC data); 
and the spillage of classified information. 
2. Report lost or stolen devices immediately to the Marine Corps Enterprise helpdesk. 
3. Be aware of social engineering and phishing attempts. Exercise caution before clicking 
on Internet links or opening attachments from an unknown source or included within 
emails that are not digitally signed. 
4. Exercise caution when conducting work on a personally-owned mobile device. 
Information transmitted via a personally-owned device (e.g. email, the Internet and 
telephone) may be accessible by anyone else on the network. BYOD participants must be 
careful when utilizing email distribution lists. Ensure recipient(s) are authorized and have 
a need-to-know prior to transmitting sensitive data. 
5. BYOD participants may not use personally-owned mobile devices to establish VPN 
connections while outside the U.S., Canada or U.S. Territories. For travel outside of these 
areas associated with official business, government furnished devices will be provided. 
When possible, BYOD participants should notify BYOD administrators at least two 
weeks prior to travel (or as soon as possible) to facilitate the issuance of a government 
furnished device. 
6. Prior to OCONUS leisure travel, BYOD participants must notify BYOD 
administrators. For security purposes the organizational container will be deactivated for 
the duration of OCONUS leisure travel. 
7. BYOD participants will notify BYOD administrators if an outside agency or 
organization seizes the personally-owned mobile device for any period of time, or if a 
lost device is suddenly found. The device must be inspected prior to resuming use of the 
organizational container. 
8. Immediately report compromised VPN or organizational container credentials to 
BYOD administrators so that they can be changed. BYOD participants will immediately 
reset the PIN required to access the device if a compromise is suspected. 
9. The transfer or separation of BYOD participants will be reported to personnel 
administration and BYOD administrators who will initiate a remote wipe of the 
organizational container and terminate remote access capabilities on the date of 
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detachment. The participant can enroll in the BYOD program (if offered) at the gaining 
organization. If organizational data stored within the organizational container is 
necessary for the BYOD participant’s follow-on assignment, the BYOD participant is 
responsible for coordinating with BYOD administrators in accordance with check-out 
procedures. 
10. BYOD participants must coordinate with USMC BYOD administrators prior to 
trading in or transferring ownership of a personally-owned device. This process ensures 
device accountability within the BYOD program and the removal of the organizational 
container prior to device trade-in or transfer. Contents of the organizational container and 
its contents will be saved by BYOD administrators and available for downloaded to the 
new device following the submission of an updated SAAR and enrollment of the new 
device. 
11. The USMC does not pay for BYOD participants to buy, operate, repair or support 
personally-owned mobile devices. BYOD participants are responsible for all costs related 
to personally-owned mobile devices, except for the management and maintenance 
associated with the organizational container. BYOD participants will have personally-
owned mobile devices inspected to ensure proper configuration and ensure there are no 
signs of physical tampering following maintenance performed by third-party service 
providers. 
12. Unless authorized, BYOD participants are allowed to register and utilize only one 
device within the USMC BYOD program. 
13. Separate policy guidance will be generated in the event of a government furlough. 
PHYSICAL CONTROLS are those actions required by BYOD participants to 
ensure the physical protection of the device and resident data. 
1. Protect all authentication credentials. Do not write down passwords and PINs or store 
them on a personally-owned device. Do not program your authentication credentials to be 
entered automatically. To prevent others from obtaining user passwords and PINS, 
BYOD participants will shield the device screen while entering credentials. Do not share 
PINs, usernames or passwords with anyone, regardless of their position of authority. 
2. BYOD participants should take every precaution to physically protect their device 
against loss, theft, damage, abuse and unauthorized use. Common best practices include: 
(a)  Maintain physical control of the device 
(b)  If the device must be left unattended, lock it in a drawer or cabinet 
(c)  Do not leave devices unattended in a locked car 
(d)  Whether on personal or business travel, never include mobile devices with 
checked luggage or with a hotel baggage service 
(e)  Lock the device in a safe while on travel 
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3. Ensure you are logged out of the organizational container prior to sharing the device 
with other individuals or family members. Use of the device by another individual should 
be of short duration and supervised. 
4. Be aware of your surroundings when discussing potentially sensitive topics while in 
public areas. 
COMPLIANCE: 
1. By signing this document, the BYOD participant acknowledges that they have read, 
acknowledged and signed DD Form 2875, System Authorization Access Request (U.S. 
Marine Corps) and the associated addendum, which outlines the mandatory DOD 
standard consent provision and Navy and Marine Corps’ user responsibilities when 
accessing Department of Defense (DOD) information systems and resources.  
2. User agrees to complete annual BYOD training requirements in addition to reading, 
signing and submitting a new BYOD user agreement. 
3. The USMC is not liable for any personal use of personally-owned mobile devices or 
for any personal data stored on devices outside of the organizational container. 
4. The USMC is not responsible for loss, defects, failures, unauthorized use, or violation 
of applicable policy or damage of or associated with personally-owned mobile devices. 
5. BYOD participant is the only authorized user of an assigned user account and will be 
held responsible for any and all activity that occurs while logged into the organizational 
container with the assigned credentials. 
6. Violations to this agreement determined to be purposeful or repeated as a result of 
BYOD participant negligence will be documented in employee evaluations and Joint 
Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) when applicable. 
Conduct which does not conform to these acceptable use guidelines may form the basis 
for appropriate disciplinary action. Penalties can range from reprimand and revocation of 
BYOD privileges for a minor infraction to removal from the Federal Service or criminal 
prosecution for the most serious violations. Employees are required to acknowledge these 
acceptable use guidelines prior to being granted BYOD access privileges. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
I, the undersigned, acknowledge that I have read this document and understand the terms 
of use and my responsibilities as an authorized USMC BYOD program participant. I 
agree to these terms in their entirety and will comply to the best of my ability at all times. 
I accept these terms freely and voluntarily of my own accord. I make no claims on my 
employer to protect any personal data that may reside on my personally-owned device, 
and I understand that any violation of these BYOD Acceptable Use Standards may be 
cause for revocation of BYOD eligibility and/or disciplinary action. 
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Telephone Number (Work and Mobile): _____________________________________ 
 
BYOD User’s Signature: __________________________________________________ 
 
Date of Signature: _______________________________________________________ 
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